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NOTES
INSIDER TRADING AND THE
MISAPPROPRIATION THEORY:
HAS THE SECOND CIRCUIT GONE TOO
FAR?
Insider trading, the buying or selling of securities based on an
illegal informational advantage,' has increased significantly during
I See 3 A. BROMBERG & L. LOWENFELS, SECURITIES FRAUD AND COMMODITIES FRAUD §
7.4(100) (Nov. 1984). "Insider trading," which has become a term of art in securities law,
denotes prohibited securities trading utilizing material nonpublic information when the
trader has a duty to disclose the information or refrain from trading, whether he is an "in-
sider" or a "tippee." See Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 654-58 (1983); Chiarella v. United
States, 445 U.S. 222, 227-29 & n.12 (1980). Although the prohibition of such trading has its
roots in common law principles governing fraudulent nondisclosure in business transactions,
see infra notes 14-23 and accompanying text, the current parameters of the prohibition and
the delineation of insider and tippee status were developed by administrative and judicial
interpretations of section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b)
(1982), and Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1986). See
Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 226-30; Diamond v. Oreamuno, 24 N.Y.2d 494, 502, 248 N.E.2d 910,
914, 30 N.Y.S.2d 78, 84-85 (1969).
"Insiders" were traditionally limited to corporate officers, directors, or majority share-
holders. See Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 99 F. Supp. 808, 828-29 (D. Del. 1952); Kardon v.
National Gypsum Co., 73 F. Supp. 798, 800 (E.D. Pa. 1947); Securities Exchange Act of 1934
§ 16(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(a) (1982). Currently, however, the term applies to individuals in a
position of trust and confidence which provides them with access to material information
not available to the public and intended for corporate purposes only. See Chiarella, 445
U.S. at 228; In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 912 (1961); infra notes 37-56 and
accompanying text (discussion of administrative and judicial expansion of insider status).
"Tippees," recipients of information from an insider, are forbidden to trade if they know or
have reason to know the insider breached a fiduciary duty in revealing the information for
personal gain. See Dirks, 463 U.S. at 660, 663; 5 A. JACOBS, LITIGATION AND PRACTICE UNDER
RULE 10b-5 § 164 (1986); infra notes 63-69 and accompanying text. "Information" has been
judicially defined as "material" if there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable investor
would consider it important in making an investment decision, see T.S.C. Indus., Inc. v.
Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976); Kripke, Rule 10b-5 Liability and "Material"
Facts, 46 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1061, 1066-70 (1971), and includes both corporate information that
relates to the internal business affairs of a corporation and market information that pertains
to the market for securities rather than the securities' intrinsic value. See Chiarella, 445
U.S. at 231; Barry, The Economics of Outside Information and Rule 10b-5, 129 U. PA. L.
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the 1980's with a concommitant increase in the Securities and Ex-
change Commission's campaign against such activity.2 While SEC
sanctions against insider trading have met with widespread ap-
proval,' Supreme Court decisions have limited the SEC's power to
REV. 1307, 1309 & n.11 (1981); Fleischer, Mundheim & Murphy, An Initial Inquiry into the
Responsibility to Disclose Market Information, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 798, 798-99 (1973).
2 See The Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1983: Hearings on H.R. 559 Before the
Subcomm. on Securities of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs,
98th Cong., 2d Sess. 33 (1984). During the hearings, then SEC Chairman John Shad re-
ported on the increased number of proceedings which have alleged insider trading viola-
tions. Id. at 33-34. Commentators have noted the sharp increase in insider trading actions
by the SEC since 1970, yet expressed doubts that such trading has been significantly af-
fected, even by successful prosecutions. See 3 A. BROMBERG & L. LOWENFELS, supra note 1,
at § 7.4(144) (Nov. 1984); Dooley, Enforcement of Insider Trading Restrictions, 66 VA. L.
REV. 1, 2, 74-83 (1980); Illegal Insider Trading Seems to Be on Rise: Ethics Issues Mud-
dled, Wall St. J., Mar. 2, 1984, at 1, col. 6.
Recent SEC investigations, which have resulted in criminal indictments, millions of dol-
lars in disgorgement orders, and civil penalties against Wall Street investment banker Den-
nis Levine and arbitrageur Ivan Boesky, underscore SEC determination to pursue those
guilty of insider trading. See Stewart & Hertzberg, Fall of Ivan F. Boesky Leads to Broader
Probe of Insider Information, Wall St. J., Nov. 17, 1986, at 1, col. 6; Obermaier, Who's an
Insider? What's Inside?, N.Y.L.J., July 1, 1986, at 2, col. 1. Justice Department officials and
SEC spokespeople have stated their determination to continue and to expand investigations
based on the Levine and Boesky revelations. See Kilborn, U.S. Said to Issue Subpoenas
Linked to Boesky Trading, N.Y. Times, Nov. 17, 1986, at Al, col. 1. As part of its continu-
ing investigation, the SEC has issued numerous subpoenas and instituted actions against
others accused of insider trading, including a former senior executive at an investment
banking firm who has pleaded guilty to the charges. See Gilpin, Companies Study Insider
-Violations, N.Y. Times, Feb. 18, 1987, at D7, col. 1; Sterngold, U.S. Expanding Insider
Inquiry, Sources Say, N.Y. Times, Feb. 17, 1987, at D1, col. 6. Additionally, individuals,
corporations, and a major New York corporate law firm have instituted private actions for
damages, relying on information revealed by Boesky. See Yashihashi, Goldman, Kidder
Cited in Unocal Insider Suit, N.Y. Times, Apr. 15, 1987, at D1, col. 1; Glaberson, A Wall
St. Firm Breaks Ranks, N.Y. Times, Apr. 12, 1987, § 3 (Business), at 1, col. 2; Wise, Class
Actions Rising in Boesky Case, N.Y.L.J., Nov. 25, 1986, at 1, col. 2.
2 See, e.g., Eichler v. Berner, 472 U.S. 299, 312-19 (1985) (referring to "egregious" con-
duct of insiders and need to encourage SEC efforts to deter insider trading); Prokesch,
Executives Favor Curbs on "Raiders," N.Y. Times, Nov. 24, 1986, at D1, col. 1 (business
leaders view indictment of Ivan Boesky as beneficial); Arkin, Insider Trading-Dis-
tinguishing Unequal Advantage from Fraud, N.Y.L.J., June 19, 1986, at 1, col. 3 (favorable
public reaction to SEC campaign). The favorable reaction to the SEC campaign against
insider trading is based primarily on traditional notions of fair play, a rationale reinforced
by the objective of federal securities legislation to protect investors, and the widely held
belief that insider trading is nothing more than a means of cheating innocent investors. See
Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 194-95 (1976); W. PAINTER, THE FEDERAL SECURI-
TIES CODE AND CORPORATE DISCLOSURE § 244 (1949); AM. BAR Ass'N COM. ON FEDERAL REG-
ULATION oF SECURITIES, Report of the Task Force on Regulation of Insider Trading-Part I:
Regulation Under the Antifraud Provisions of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, re-
printed in 41 Bus. LAw. 223, 227 (1985) [hereinafter ABA COMMITTEE REPORT]. The SEC
has consistently invoked the unfairness of insider trading in support of its position; the
courts and Congress have long endorsed this rationale. See Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 222 (citing
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pursue and penalize insider trading by market outsiders4 and their
In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 912 (1961)); Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228, 237 (2d Cir. 1974); H.R. REP. No. 355, 98th Cong., 1st
Sess. 2-3 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS, 2274, 2275-76. A major-
ity of commentators have also accepted the fairness rationale as a controlling factor in pub-
lic perception. See W. PAINTER, supra, at 249; Langevoort, Insider Trading and the Fiduci-
ary Principle: A Post-Chiarella Restatement, 70 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 1 & n.2, 2, 52-53 (1982).
These commentators have also stressed the deleterious effects of insider trading on market
economy and efficiency. See Brudney, Insiders, Outsiders and Informational Advantages
Under the Federal Securities Laws, 93 HARv. L. REV. 322, 334-35 (1979). They maintain
that permitting such trading decreases the flow of capital investment into an "unfair" mar-
ketplace and increases the insider's incentive to manipulate the market by inhibiting the
dissemination of material, securities-related information. See id. at 355-56; ABA COMMITrEE
REPORT, supra, at 227-29; Schotland, Unsafe at Any Price: A Reply to Manne, INSIDER
TRADING AND THE STOCK MARKET, 53 VA. L. REV. 1425, 1448-49 (1967).
Conversely, some commentators argue that insider trading is beneficial to corporate and
market efficiency because it dispenses information quickly into the marketplace and pro-
vides incentives for corporate managers. See H. MANNE, INSIDER TRADING AND THE STOCK
MARKET, 80-83 (1966); Carlton & Fischel, The Regulation of Insider Trading, 35 STAN. L.
REV. 857, 866-72 (1983); Dooley, supra note 2, at 72. Professor Manne, whose work has gen-
erated wide debate regarding the policy basis for insider trading, further maintains that
restricting insider trading ignores objective goals of allocative efficiency, and that investors
would be better served by a system which permits stock prices to move toward "true" val-
ues. See H. MANNE, supra, at 2-4, 59-75, 99-103. Others have suggested that the SEC pro-
gram and attendant publicity may reduce investor confidence and that the costs of waging
an effective program may outweigh the benefits. See Branson, Discourse on the Supreme
Court Approach to SEC Rule 10b-5 and Insider Trading, 30 EMORY L.J. 263, 300-01 (1981);
Scott, Insider Trading: Rule 10b-5, Disclosure and Corporate Privacy, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 801,
812, 818 (1980).
Current debate centers on the perceived expansion of the scope of section 10(b) and
Rule 10b-5 in recent SEC actions against alleged insider traders. See Kohn, Bar Council
Panelists Split on SEC Record with Insiders, N.Y.L.J., Feb. 11, 1987, at 1, col. 3; Rakoff,
Business Crime: The Great 10b-5 Wars, N.Y.L.J., Jan. 8, 1987, at 2, col. 3; Daugherty, SEC
'87: A Special Report, Insider Trading Charges Controversial, N.Y.L.J., Dec. 8, 1986, at 46,
col. 4. The sharp increase in criminal actions and the perceived need to establish more de-
finitive guidelines as to the parameters of the illegal activity have highlighted these con-
cerns. See COMM. ON CRIMINAL LAW OF THE ASS'N OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK,
FEDERAL CRIMINAL LIABILITY FOR INSIDER TRADING OF SECURITIES, 1-2, 17-18 (1987) [hereinaf-
ter NYC BAR COMMITTEE REPORT]; Kostelanetz & Scott, Insider Trading-Development of
Its Criminal Aspects, N.Y.L.J., Feb. 9, 1987, at 1, col. 4.
Notwithstanding these debates, the vast majority of commentators and scholars are
agreed that prohibition of insider trading is justified by the need to safeguard the integrity
and fairness of the marketplace and to protect private investors. See Brudney, supra, at
355-56; Gilson & Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REv. 549, 627-
643 (1984); Wang, Trading on Material Nonpublic Information on Impersonal Stock Mar-
kets: Who Is Harmed, and Who Can Sue Whom Under SEC Rule 10b-5?, 54 S. CAL. L. REV.
1217, 1248, 1321 (1981).
' "Outsiders" are those who gain access to material nonpublic information although
they have no direct or temporary relationship to the corporate issuer or stockholders whose
stock is traded. See Aldave, Misappropriation: A General Theory for Trading on Nonpub-
lic Information, 13 HOFSTRA L. REV. 101, 112 (1984).
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tippees. The Court has held that section 10(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934," the statutory basis for the prohibition of
insider trading, is ingrained with common law fraud principles.7
Consequently, the Court has barred any expansion of SEC Rule
10b-5," the regulation that activates the anti-fraud provisions of
5 See Chiarella, 445 U.S. 222, 231-35 (1980). The Chiarella Court held that a market
outsider, who had no fiduciary relationship with the shareholders from whom he purchased
stock, had not violated section 10(b) or Rule 10b-5 since he did not have a duty to disclose
before trading. See id.; infra notes 57-62 and accompanying text. Three years later, in Dirks
v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983), the Court held that a tippee violates section 10(b) and Rule
10b-5 only if the insider breached a fiduciary obligation for personal gain and if the tippee
knew or had reason to know of the breach. See Dirks, 463 U.S. at 660-63; infra notes 63-69
and accompanying text.
0 Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1982). The section pro-
vides in part:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means
or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of any
national securities exchange-
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security
registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, any
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and
regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the
public interest or for the protection of investors.
Id.
. See Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 227-30. The Chiarella Court relied on the statutory lan-
guage and the legislative, administrative, and judicial history of section 10(b) and Rule lob-
5 for its finding that violations must be predicated on the common law requirement of a
breach of the duty to disclose or refrain from trading arising from a fiduciary relationship.
See id. at 231-35. The Court later reaffirmed this holding in Dirks, 463 U.S. at 654.
In previous cases, when considering elements necessary for section 10(b) violations, the
Supreme Court consistently assumed that the traditional elements of the common law ac-
tion for fraudulent nondisclosure must be met. The Court stated that mere internal corpo-
rate mismanagement does not constitute the fraud necessary for a violation of section 10(b).
See Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co., 404 U.S. 6, 12 (1971). Subse-
quently, the Court delineated the common law deceit elements of materiality, causation, and
reliance as they apply in a private cause of action pursuant to a section 10(b) violation. See
Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 153-54 (1972). Moreover, the
Court emphasized the need to establish scienter and manipulation or deception during the
breach of a fiduciary relationship as requisites to liability under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-
5. See Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 701-02 (1980) (allegation of scienter necessary for SEC
civil action); Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 473-74 (1977) (fraud claim lies if al-
leged conduct viewable as manipulative or deceptive); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S.
185, 193 (1976). See also Anderson, Fraud, Fiduciaries and Insider Trading, 10 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 341, 342-51 (1982) (discussing Court's imposition of common law misrepresentation
requirements for violation of section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5).
8 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1986). Rule 10b-5 provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility
of any national securities exchange,
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section 10(b), beyond its statutory mandate.9 In particular, the Su-
preme Court has stated that for nondisclosure of information in
securities transactions to constitute fraudulent misrepresentation,
a relationship of trust and confidence must exist before either a
duty to disclose the information or abstain from trading arises."0 In
response to these restrictions on Rule 10b-5, the SEC and the Sec-
ond Circuit have advocated a misappropriation of information the-
ory.1' Under this theory, an employee breaches the fiduciary duty
of confidentiality to the employer by converting material nonpublic
information for private use in securities market trading and
thereby commits the requisite fraud for a Rule 10b-5 violation.' 2
The Second Circuit has recently extended the theory to encompass
the misappropriation of information from an employer who had no
interest in the securities market.'3
This Note will address the conflict between the Second Circuit
and the Supreme Court with respect to Rule 10b-5 liability. First,
the common law governing fraudulent nondisclosure will be dis-
cussed, together with the administrative and judicial movement
away from common law principles after the promulgation of Rule
10b-5. The Supreme Court's affirmance of the common law basis of
section 10(b) will be presented as a logical outgrowth of previous
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security.
Id.
9 See Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 234-35; Ernst & Ernst, 425 U.S. at 213-14; Blue Chip
Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 756 (1975) (Powell, J., concurring). While not-
ing that "administrative and judicial interpretations have established that silence in connec-
tion with the purchase or sale of securities may operate as a fraud actionable under §
10(b)," the Chiarella Court stressed that "liability is premised upon a duty to disclose aris-
ing from a relationship of trust and confidence between parties to a transaction." Chiarella,
445 U.S. at 230.
10 See Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 654 (1983); Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 229-30.
" See United States v. Carpenter, 791 F.2d 1024 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 107 S. Ct. 666
(1986); SEC v. Materia, 745 F.2d 197 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1053 (1985);
United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d 12, aff'd, 722 F.2d 729 (1981), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 863
(1983).
" See Carpenter, 791 F.2d at 1034; Materia, 745 F.2d at 199; Newman, 664 F.2d at 15-
16; infra notes 78-97 and accompanying text (discussion of these cases).
Is See Carpenter, 791 F.2d at 1026, 1028-29 (discussed infra notes 90-97 and accompa-
nying text).
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case law. The origins and development of the misappropriation
theory will be evaluated in light of both the Supreme Court restric-
tions on Rule 10b-5 liability and the general objectives of securities
anti-fraud legislation. Finally, this Note will suggest that current
application of the theory by the Second Circuit does not comport
with Supreme Court guidelines or effectuate the major objectives
of the securities laws.
COMMON LAW NONDISCLOSURE AND FIDUCIARY PRINCIPLES
Prior to the enactment of federal securities legislation, the
common law action for deceit had evolved as the appropriate rem-
edy for fraudulent misrepresentation. 4 However, it was generally
unavailable for the nondisclosure of material information in busi-
ness transactions. 5 Such nondisclosure was actionable only when a
fiduciary relationship existed that imposed a duty to speak upon
,4 See 5 A. JACOBS, supra note 1, § 2.01(a) (remedy for misrepresentation limited to
deceit or rescission action); W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS § 105, at 728 (5th
ed. 1984) (deceit action is common law remedy for misrepresentation); WINFIELD, PROVINCE
OF THE LAW OF TORT 13-14 (1931) (same). In a deceit action, the plaintiff must prove that
the defendant falsely represented a material fact with the knowledge of its falsity (scienter),
and with an intention to induce plaintiff to act or refrain from acting in reliance on the
misrepresentation. Further, the plaintiff must show justifiable reliance on the representation
and damages as the result of that reliance. W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra, § 105, at 728;
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 525 (1977). Although these elements primarily apply to
actions for damages or rescission arising from affirmative misrepresentation, the Supreme
Court has also required that they be satisfied in actions based on fraudulent nondisclosure.
The information must be material to the transaction, see supra note 1, and the defendant
must have acted with scienter. See Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 701-02 (1980); Ernst &
Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 (1976). Causation in fact is subsumed from the obli-
gation to disclose and withholding of a material fact, and reliance is presumed from the
prohibited trading. See Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 153-
54 (1972).
15 See W. PROSSER & IV. KEETON, supra note 14, § 106, at 737; Langevoort, supra note
3, at 5-7. This position drew early support from Chief Justice John Marshall in Laidlaw v.
Organ, 15 U.S. (2 Wheat.) 178, 195 (1817). This case involved a New Orleans tobacco
merchant who purchased tobacco without informing the vendee that American and British
commissioners had signed a treaty at Ghent which would materially affect the price of to-
bacco by lifting the blockade of the American port. See id. at 182-83. In a six sentence
opinion, Chief Justice Marshall upheld the then prevailing doctrine of caveat emptor. Chief
Justice Marshall stated that a merchant is under no obligation to communicate information
exclusively within his knowledge, even if the information would affect the price of the com-
modity being sold and added: "[i]t would be difficult to circumscribe the contrary doctrine
... where the means of intelligence are equally accessible to both parties." Id. at 194. This
view reflected and reinforced the belief that a party to a business transaction was free to
profit from his diligence and business acumen and was under no obligation to share the
fruits of his industry and skill. See Keeton, Fraud-Concealment and Non-Disclosure, 15
TEx. L. REV. 1, 31 (1936).
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the parties to the transaction.' 6 In applying traditional fiduciary
relationship requirements to securities transactions, courts devel-
oped three views.' 7 The majority view held that corporate officers
and directors owed a fiduciary duty to the corporate entity and
shareholders only in their dealings on behalf of the corporation."8
Therefore, in private trading, no fiduciary relationship existed and
corporate insiders were under no obligation to disclose material
nonpublic information before trading.19 The minority view held
that the corporate insider served as the "quasi-trustee" of the
shareholder's interest, thereby establishing a relationship which
imposed the full panoply of fiduciary obligations, including the
duty to disclose material information before trading in face-to-face
transactions with existing shareholders. ° Under an intermediate
16 See, e.g., Edward Barron Estate Co. v. Woodruff Co., 163 Cal. 561, 568, 126 P. 351,
357-58 (1912); W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 14, § 106, at 738; RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF TORTS § 551(1), (2)(a) (1977).
1 See Freeman v. Decio, 584 F.2d 186, 191 (7th Cir. 1978); H. BALLANTINE, CORPORA-
TIONS § 80 (rev. ed. 1946); 3A W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS §8
1167-1174 (rev. perm. ed. 1986).
" See Chenery Corp. v. SEC, 128 F.2d 303, 308 (D.C. Cir. 1942); Crowell v. Jackson, 53
N.J.L. 656, 657, 23 A. 426, 427 (1891); Hun v. Cary, 82 N.Y. 65, 71 (1880). This view arose
from the doctrine of caveat emptor and is predicated on the belief that shareholders have
"constructive knowledge" of the corporation's affairs since they have access to the corporate
books. See Walsh v. Goulden, 130 Mich. 531, 540, 90 N.W. 406, 410 (1902). In addition, a
stockholder dealing with a corporate officer or director can inquire as to whether the official
has any confidential, material information and if he responds untruthfully, bring an action
for fraudulent misrepresentation. See Geller v. Transamerica Corp., 53 F. Supp. 625, 630 (D.
Del. 1943), aff'd per curiam, 151 F.2d 534 (3d Cir. 1945).
1 See Chenery, 128 F.2d at 308; Goodwin v. Agassiz, 283 Mass. 358, 363, 186 N.E. 659,
661 (1933). Although a corporate officer or director who utilizes his access to material non-
public information to profit at the expense of the shareholders in the corporation he serves
seems to violate traditional moral and ethical principles, the Goodwin court, in applying the
doctrine, succinctly noted:
Fiduciary obligations of directors ought not to be made so onerous that men of
experience and ability will be deterred from accepting such office. Law in its sanc-
tions is not coextensive with morality. It cannot undertake to put all parties to
every contract on an equality as to knowledge, experience, skill and shrewdness.
Goodwin, 283 Mass. at 363, 186 N.E. at 661. But see H. BALLANTINE, supra note 17, at 213
(majority rule criticized as "rule of unconscionable laxity").
20 See Oliver v. Oliver, 118 Ga. 362, 367, 45 S.E. 232, 23-34 (1902); Hotchkiss v. Fischer,
136 Kan. 530, 536-37, 16 P.2d 531, 534-35 (1932). In developing the minority view, courts
rejected the "constructive knowledge" basis of the majority view as being unrealistic and
stated that, when trading in securities of their own large, publicly held corporations, officers
and directors are "quasi-trustees" with respect to the individual stockholder's shares in
face-to-face transactions. See Oliver, 118 Ga. at 367, 45 S.E. at 233; Note, Rule 10b-5 and
the Duty to Disclose Market Information: It Takes a Thief, 55 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 93, 98
(1980). Further, if an officer or director undertakes to disclose information regarding the
status of the corporation, he is bound to explain the possible ramifications to the share-
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view, the "special facts" doctrine, the corporate insider's posses-
sion of information that could significantly affect the value of the
stockholder's shares and could not be ascertained through exami-
nation of the corporation's books created a fiduciary relationship
and an obligation to disclose the information before trading.21 Al-
though most jurisdictions officially adhered to the majority posi-
tion, courts increasingly employed the "special facts" doctrine to
establish a fiduciary obligation in face-to-face transactions.22
Under this approach, however, the insider owed no duty to disclose
his privy information either in impersonal stock exchange transac-
holder. See Hotchkiss, 136 Kan. at 536-37, 16 P.2d at 534. Professor Langevoort has noted
that this rule placed "on all corporate officers and directors a general obligation of affirma-
tive disclosure when dealing with shareholders, in recognition of the fiduciary status that
exists between them," at least in face-to-face transactions. See Langevoort, supra note 3, at
5.
5 1 See Strong v. Repide, 213 U.S. 419, 431 (1909); Buckley v. Buckley, 230 Mich. 504,
509, 202 N.W. 955, 956 (1925). In Strong, which gave rise to the "special facts" doctrine, the
plaintiff was a former shareholder of a Philippine sugar company who was induced to sell
her shares to the defendant, a director and owner of three-fourths of the shares. See Strong,
213 U.S. at 421. The defendant did not reveal his identity as the purchaser of the shares,
nor the nearly completed negotiations for the sale of the corporation's land, which would
have significantly increased the value of the shares. Id. at 422. The Court concluded that the
"special circumstances" of the case, including the fact that the defendant was a director in
charge of operations, a majority shareholder, and the chief negotiator for the sale of the
land, were sufficient to hold that the defendant had a duty to reveal material information
when purchasing shares from other stockholders. Id. at 431. By 1925, the "special facts"
were delineated as any "fact or condition enhancing the value of the stock, known by the
officer or officers, not known by the stockholder, and not to be ascertained by an inspection
of the books." Buckley, 230 Mich. at 508, 202 N.W. at 956. As applied by the courts, the
doctrine rests on a combination of the status of the defendant as a corporate officer or
director and his possession of material nonpublic information. See id.
22 The trend toward imposing a duty to disclose material nonpublic information in
face-to-face transactions between corporate officers or directors and shareholders was fore-
shadowed in a case which applied the majority view. See Goodwin, 284 Mass. at 362, 186
N.E. at 660. Although holding that the corporate defendant had no obligation to disclose the
information he possessed, the court indicated that the result might have been different had
the defendant sought out the shareholders in order to purchase their stock. See id. The
court thus acknowledged that a corporate officer's or director's possession of "special facts"
imposed at least the duty to refrain from affirmatively exploiting his informational advan-
tage in dealings with existing shareholders. Id.
As the majority rule substantially merged into the "special facts" doctrine, the "facts"
were expanded to include the knowledge of corporate officers and directors regarding impor-
tant transactions such as prospective mergers or other corporate reorganizations, probable
liquidation, agreements with third parties to buy large blocks of stock, and impending decla-
rations of high dividends. See Arlinghaus v. Ritenour, 622 F.2d 629, 636 (2d Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 1013 (1981) and New York cases cited therein; Agatucci v. Corradi, 327 Ill.
App. 153, 157-58, 63 N.E.2d 630, 632 (1945); H. BALLANTINE, supra note 17, at 213.
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tions or to purchasers who were not already shareholders.23
SECURITIES LEGISLATION AND EARLY ADAPTATION OF COMMON LAW
FIDUCIARY PRINCIPLES
The Securities Act of 193324 ("1933 Act") and the Securities
Exchange Act of 193425 ("1934 Act") sought to restore investor
confidence in the securities markets in the aftermath of the stock
market crash of 1929 by substituting a philosophy of full disclosure
for the philosophy of caveat emptor2 In response to revelations
23 See Gratz v. Claughton, 187 F.2d 46, 49 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 920 (1951); 3
L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 1455 (2d ed. 1961). In Gratz, Judge Learned Hand acknowl-
edged that a corporate officer's or director's fiduciary relationship had been traditionally
limited to the corporation and existing shareholders, but nevertheless extended the relation-
ship to include persons previously not shareholders of the corporation. See id.; Chiarella v.
United States, 445 U.S. 222, 227 n.8 (1980). Furthermore, there was no duty of disclosure if
a majority shareholder dealt with a minority shareholder. See Geller v. Transamerica Corp.,
53 F. Supp. 625, 630 (D. Del. 1943), aff'd per curiam, 151 F.2d 534 (3d Cir. 1945). Although
not expressly decided, the court in Goodwin strongly suggested that an officer or director
trading in an impersonal stock exchange has no duty to disclose. See Goodwin v. Agassiz,
283 Mass. 358, 362-63, 186 N.E. 659, 661 (1933); Note, Insider Trading at Common Law, 51
U. CHI. L. REV. 838, 859 (1984).
24 Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1982).
25 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1982).
26 See S. REP. No. 47, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 6-7 (1933), reprinted in 5 LEGISLATIVE HIS-
TORY OF THE SECURITIES AcT OF 1933 AND SECURITIES EXCHANGE AcT OF 1934 Item 17 (J.
Ellenberger & E. Mahar comp. 1973) [hereinafter LEGISLATIVE HISTORY]. In recommending
federal securities legislation, President Franklin Roosevelt stated:
This proposal adds to the ancient rule of caveat emptor, the further doctrine
"Let the seller also beware." It puts the burden of telling the whole truth on the
seller....
What we seek is a return to a clearer understanding of the ancient truth that
those who manage banks, corporations, and other agencies handling or using other
people's money are trustees acting for others.
Id. at Item 3. While considering the proposed legislation, Congress was made acutely aware
of the speculative methods used by those possessing inside information to the detriment of
the investing public. See S. REP. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1934), reprinted in 5 LEGIS-
LATIVE HISTORY, supra, at Item 17. Official investigations into the stock market had revealed
"widespread fraud, manipulation, and victimization of public investors by concealment of
relevant information." 1 A. BROMBERG & L. LOWENFELS, supra note 1, § 2.2(110) (Oct. 1979);
see generally S. REP. No. 1455, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934), reprinted in 5 LEGISLATIVE HIS-
TORY, supra, at Item 21 (official summary of the investigation). Among the practices of spe-
cial concern to Congress were those by corporate insiders and controlling stockholders who
had betrayed their fiduciary duties by using inside information for their own advantage. See
S. REP. No. 792, supra, at 9; S. REP. No. 1455, supra, at 55-68; H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong.,
2d Sess 11, 13-14, reprinted in 5 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra, at Item 18. In enacting the
1933 and 1934 Acts, Congress sought to avoid repetition of these speculative practices, pre-
serve market integrity, and protect private investors. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425
U.S. 185, 195, 198 (1976); SEN. REP. No. 792, supra, at 9; H.R. REP. No. 1383, supra, at 2-7,
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regarding pervasive market manipulation, Congress included anti-
fraud provisions in both Acts.27 The broadest proscriptions in this
regard are found in section 17(a) of the 1933 Act and section 10(b)
of the 1934 Act.28 Since section 17(a) is limited to the sale or offer
for sale of securities, section 10(b), which broadly prohibits the use
of "any manipulative or deceptive device" in both the purchase
and sale of securities, has provided the statutory basis for the pro-
scriptions of insider trading.29 However, section 10(b) remained
13-14 & passim. For a comprehensive discussion of the 1933 and 1934 Acts as they relate to
mandatory disclosure and insider trading, see Seligman, The Reformulation of Federal Se-
curities Law Concerning Nonpublic Information, 73 GEo. L.J. 1083, 1103-15 (1985).
27 The major anti-fraud provisions in the 1933 Act are sections 11, 12, and 17(a). 15
U.S.C. §§ 77k, 771, 77q(a) (1982). Those in the 1934 Act are sections 9, 10(b), 15(c)(1) and
(2), and 16(b). 15 U.S.C. §§ 78i, 78j(b), 78o(c)(1), (2), 78p(b) (1982). Of these provisions,
only section 17(a) of the 1933 Act and sections 10(b) and 16(b) of the 1934 Act are germane
to consideration of insider trading. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77q(a), 78j(b), 78p(b) (1982).
President Roosevelt, in writing to the Chairman of the Banking and Currency Commit-
tee regarding the bill that was to become the 1934 Act, emphasized the need for legislation
which would prevent "the terrible conditions of the years following 1929," and provide the
government with the power to police the securities industry. See S. REP. No. 792, supra note
26, at 2.
22 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77q(a), 78j(b) (1982). For the text of section 10(b), see supra note 6.
Section 17(a) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person in the offer or sale of any securities by the use
of any means or instruments of transportation or communication in interstate
commerce or by the use of the mails, directly or indirectly-
(1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, or
(2) to obtain money or property by means of any untrue statement of a mate-
rial fact or any omission to state a material fact necessary in order to make the
statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made,
not misleading, or
(3) to engage in any transaction, practice, or course of business which oper-
ates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon the purchaser.
15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1982).
29 See supra notes 6 and 28 for the texts of sections 10(b) and 17(a). Although these
provisions do not specifically prohibit insider trading, see 15 U.S.C. §§ 77q(a), 78j(b) (1982),
they have been administratively and judicially interpreted as encompassing such activity.
See, e.g., Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 151-52 (1972) (bank
employees liable under section 10(b) for failure to disclose material information regarding
stock value); In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 912 (1961) (brokerage firm liable for
trading on basis of material information received from insider pursuant to sections 17(a),
10(b), and Rule 10b-5).
The only specific statutory prohibition of insider trading is in section 16(b) of the 1934
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1982). However, this section is limited to corporate officers, direc-
tors, and holders of more than ten percent of a corporation's registered securities who com-
plete a purchase-sale or sale-purchase transaction in the corporation's equity securities
within a six-month period. See id.; 15 U.S.C. § 78p(a) (1982) (10% shareholders). Section
16(b) is self-executing and provides for a private cause of action by or on behalf of the issuer
to recover any profit realized by the insider. See 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1982). It does not,
1986]
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relatively dormant until the SEC promulgated Rule 10b-5 pursu-
ant to its rule-making power."s
Rule 10b-5 was promulgated specifically to close "a loophole in
the protection against fraud.., by prohibiting individuals or com-
panies from buying securities if they engage in fraud in their
purchase."' Modeled after section 17(a) of the 1933 Act, Rule 10b-
however, cover single transactions (that is, only a purchase or only a sale) or encompass
trading on material nonpublic information by insiders other than those specifically desig-
nated in the statute. See id. For a discussion of section 16(b)'s provisions, see 2 L. Loss,
supra note 23, at 1040-90 (1961 & Supp. 1969); 5 A. JAcoBs, supra note 1, § 3.02(g), at 1-133
to 1-144. While section 17(a) of the 1933 Act is not as limited as section 16(b) of the 1934
Act, compare 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1982) (section 17(a)) with 15 U.S.C. §78p(b) (1982) (sec-
tion 16(b)), it is directed at the sale or offer for sale of securities. See 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a)
(1982). As Professor Loss has pointed out, even if the language could be interpreted to in-
clude purchasers of securities, the SEC has used it only against sellers. See L. Loss, FUNDA-
MENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION 801 (1983).
Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act, however, encompasses both the purchase and sale of
securities, yet contains no limitations such as those found in section 16(b) as to the parties
covered by its proscriptions or to the time period during which the forbidden activity must
occur. See 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1982). Additionally, section 10(b) covers single transactions.
See id.; supra note 6 (text of section). Although section 10(b) does not contain a provision
for a private cause of action, one has been judicially created in order to effectuate the pur-
pose of the statute and is not limited to recovery by or on behalf of the issuing corporation.
See Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 380 (1983); Kardon v. National Gyp-
sum Co., 73 F. Supp 798, 800 (E.D. Pa. 1947). However, section 16(b) was a factor in Judge
Augustus Hand's determination that the coverage of section 10(b) did not extend to fraudu-
lent mismanagement of corporate affairs and that the section protected only buyers and
sellers of securities. See Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461, 464 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 343 U.S. 956 (1952).
The limited legislative history available pertaining to section 10(b) provides little guid-
ance as to the scope of its prohibitions. See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 226
(1980). In explaining the original version of the section, a government spokesman briefly
summed up its purpose as being a "catch-all clause" giving the Commission authority to
deal with new manipulative practices, adding, "Subsection [(b)] says, 'Thou shalt not devise
any other cunning devices."' Stock Exchange Regulation: Hearings on H.R. 7852 & H.R.
8720 Before the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 73d Cong., 2d Sess.
115 (1934), reprinted in 8 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 26, at Item 23 (statement of
Thomas Corcoran). After going through the congressional revision process with only minor
changes and little controversy, see 1 A. BROMBERG & L. LOWENFELS, supra note 1, § 2.2(310)-
(331) (Oct. 1979), section 10(b) emerged as a broad prohibition of "manipulative and decep-
tive practices which have been demonstrated to fulfill no useful function." S. REP. No. 792,
supra note 26, at 6. However, section 10(b) is not self-activating and requires the promulga-
tion "of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appro-
priate in the public interest or for the protection of investors." 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1982).
10 See 1 A. BROMBERG & L. LOWENFELS, supra note 1, § 2.2(510) (Oct. 1983 & Oct. 1979)
(summary of rules under section 10(b)). Prior to 1942, the SEC had promulgated rules
under the section but they were generally limited in applicability and did not provide the
means to prohibit or penalize insider trading. See id.; see also supra note 8 (text of Rule
lOb-5); infra notes 31-33 and accompanying text (Rule's history and purpose).
" SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 3230 (May 21, 1942).
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5 was broadened to encompass the purchase as well as the sale of
securities." Few academics or securities market participants fore-
saw the far-reaching impact it was to have as the SEC's major
weapon against insider trading.3 3
In early cases brought under Rule 10b-5, the courts held that
the proscribed behavior must at least meet the minimum common
law requirements for fraudulent nondisclosure.34 At the same time,
32 See supra notes 8 and 28 (texts of Rule 10b-5 and section 17(a)). The changes made
in adapting section 17(a) broadened the scope of Rule 10b-5 by using less specific language
to delineate the proscribed behavior and by making it applicable to "fraud or deceit upon
any person, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security." See supra note 8 (text
of Rule 10b-5); see also General Discussion, American Bar Association Conference on Codi-
fication of the Federal Securities Laws (Nov. 18-19, 1966), reprinted in 22 Bus. LAW 793,
922-23 (1967) [hereinafter ABA Conference] (remarks of Milton Freeman, co-drafter of Rule
10b-5). Two staff attorneys, frustrated at the SEC's inability to penalize the unethical be-
havior of a company official who was purchasing company stock at deflated prices by mis-
representing the company's financial status to shareholders, hastily drafted the Rule to acti-
vate section 10(b)'s prohibitions. Id. The only comment made during the staff meeting at
which the Commission summarily adopted the Rule was "Well... we are against fraud,
aren't we?" Id. Professor Manne has attacked the promulgation of the Rule as procedurally
infirm, see Manne, Insider Trading and the Administrative Process, 35 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
473 (1973), and Professor Loss has referred to the procedure as "backdoor jurisprudence
with a vengeance." Loss, History of S.E.C. Legislative Programs and Suggestions for a
Code, in ABA Conference, supra, at 796. Rule 10b-5 was held to be constitutionally sound
in Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 99 F. Supp. 808, 831-32 (D. Del. 1951). See 5 A. JACOBS,
supra note 1, § 66.02 (judicial acceptance of Rule).
13 See ABA Conference, supra note 32, at 32. Milton Freeman has asserted that the
purpose of Rule 10b-5 was to prevent fraudulent purchases by corporate officials owing a
fiduciary duty to shareholders. He has assailed the extension of the Rule to cover the activi-
ties of outsiders, since this goes beyond the aim of the Rule. See Freeman, The Insider
Trading Sanctions Bill - A Neglected Opportunity, 4 PACE L. REv. 221, 222-23 (1984).
For forty-four years, courts and commentators have debated the meaning and scope of
Rule 10b-5. It has been referred to as "plain, concise and unambiguous" by one court,
Mitchell v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 90, 96 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1004
(1971), and as "a judicial oak which has grown from little more than a legislative acorn" by
another. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 737 (1975). Professor Loss
has termed it "a horse of dubious pedigree but very fleet of foot," L. Loss, supra note 29, at
820, while another commentator has termed it "the mysterious and ubiquitous rule 10b-5."
Kitch, A Federal Vision of the Securities Laws, 70 VA. L. REV. 857, 859 (1984). From its
modest beginning, Rule 10b-5 has become the SEC's major weapon in its battle against
insider trading. The interaction of legislation, administrative rule-making, and the judicial
process has produced an entire body of securities law which is still developing and changing.
See, e.g., A. JACOBS, LITIGATION AND PRACTICE UNDER RULE 10b-5 (1983) (multi-volume work
devoted to Rule 10b-5).
34 See, e.g., Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461, 464 (2d Cir. 1952) (holding
Rule 10b-5 action limited to frauds traditionally associated with securities sales), cert. de-
nied, 343 U.S. 956 (1953); Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 73 F. Supp. 798, 802-03 (E.D.
Pa. 1947) (court relied on principles governing fiduciary relationships to impose liability on
corporate directors).
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however, the judiciary agreed that securities anti-fraud legislation
was intended to expand the parameters of existing legal reme-
dies. 5 In an effort to effectuate the perceived aims of securities
legislation while adhering to common law principles, courts opted
to impose fiduciary obligations on corporate insiders through adop-
tion of the "special facts" or "trusteeship" doctrines.3 6
EXPANSION OF COMMON LAW FIDUCIARY PRINCIPLES
For almost twenty years after the promulgation of Rule 10b-5,
courts limited their focus to the activities of corporate insiders
trading on the basis of material corporate information.3 7 Insider fi-
" See Charles Hughes & Co. v. SEC, 139 F.2d 434, 437 (2d Cir.) (relying on SEC inter-
pretation of section 17(a) of 1933 Act rather than common law), cert. denied, 321 U.S. 786
(1943); Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 99 F. Supp. 808, 829 (D. Del. 1951) (extended common
law fiduciary duties to majority shareholders); see also Hooper v. Mountain States Sec.
Corp., 282 F.2d 195, 201 (5th Cir. 1960) (rejecting Rule 10b-5 limitation to common law
fraud), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 814 (1961).
11 See Charles Hughes & Co., 139 F.2d at 437. Judge Clark stated that there was "no
difference between express representation on the one hand and implied misrepresentation
or concealment on the other," and rejected the caveat emptor doctrine. Id. In doing so,
Judge Clark noted that "[tihe essential objective of securities legislation is to protect those
who do not know market conditions from the overreachings of those who do," and that the
silence of the defendants thereby constituted fraud under section 17(a) of the 1933 Act. Id.
at 437-38. The court further held that the brokerage company, primarily selling stock to
single women and widows, was "under a special duty.., not to take advantage of its cus-
tomers' ignorance of market conditions," based on the confidential relationship established
between them. Id. at 437. This holding differed significantly from the majority view, as it
imposed fiduciary obligations on the sellers through the use of the "special facts" and
"quasi-trustee" doctrines. See supra notes 20-23 and accompanying text.
Four years later, in a case involving corporate officers and directors who purchased cor-
porate stock without disclosing material information in their possession, a district court im-
posed liability under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, holding the defendants to the fiduciary
obligations of a trustee. See Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 73 F. Supp. 798, 803 (E.D. Pa.
1947). In doing so, Judge Kirkpatrick also established the first private cause of action under
a "liberal construction" of section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 in order to effectuate securities
legislation through "application of well known and well-established equitable principles gov-
erning fiduciary relationships." See id. at 800-03. Subsequently, in Speed v. Transamerica,
Chief Judge Leahy upheld a Rule 10b-5 action and significantly expanded the common law
parameters of fiduciary relationships by imposing trustee fiduciary duties on majority share-
holders in transactions with minority shareholders. See Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 99 F.
Supp. 808, 828-29 (D. Del. 1951). Chief Judge Leahy acknowledged that no such obligation
existed at common law. See id. These decisions established that corporate insiders, which
now included majority shareholders, would be held to fiduciary obligation standards in deal-
ings with corporate shareholders under either the "special facts" or "trusteeship" view in
order to effectuate what the judiciary had determined was the remedial objective of Rule
10b-5.
11 See L. Loss, supra note 29, at 802 (noting limited use of Rule 10b-5 in early years
after promulgation); Phillips & Zutz, The Insider Trading Doctrine: A Need for Legislative
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duciary obligations encompassed trading with both purchasers and
sellers of the issuing company's securities in face-to-face transac-
tions and impersonal transactions on national exchanges.,
In an effort to prohibit unfair trading by nontraditional insid-
ers, the SEC expanded the definition of insiders. In 1961, then
SEC Chairman William Cary, writing for the Commission in In re
Cady, Roberts & Co.,39 emphasized that Rule 10b-5 restricts the
trading activities of "any person" who has a relationship that al-
lows access to material nonpublic information and expressly based
the decision on the "inherent unfairness" of insider trading.40
Under the Cady, Roberts delineation of insider trading, the insider
need no longer be a corporate official, director, or controlling
shareholder. The list of insiders having a fiduciary obligation to
disclose or abstain from trading was extended to include "those
persons who are in a special relationship with a company and privy
to its internal affairs, and thereby suffer correlative duties in trad-
ing in its securities. '41
Repair, 13 HOFsTRA L. REV. 65, 73-75 (1984) (discussing limited scope and applicability of
Rule lOb-5 in early years); Comment, The Prospects for Rule X-1OB-5: An Emerging Rem-
edy for Defrauded Investors, 59 YALE L.J. 1120, 1143 & n.108 (1950) (SEC used Rule 10b-5
against corporate insiders).
38 See Gratz v. Claughton, 187 F.2d 46, 49 (2d Cir.) (protection of section 16(b) ex-
tended to buyers not prior beneficiaries), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 920 (1951). Beginning in
1943, the SEC and the lower courts systematically adapted and expanded common law
fraud principles. The rationale for such expansion was that Congress intended to adopt the
most progressive common law principles in enacting securities anti-fraud legislation. After
first adopting the "trusteeship" or "special facts" view regarding the fiduciary obligations of
corporate insiders, see supra notes 20-23 and accompanying text, the courts extended the
obligation to buyers of securities who were not previous owners of corporation stock and
thus were not considered beneficiaries under the common law. At the same time, courts
confirmed that buyers and sellers had a private cause of action for damages arising from the
insider's trading. See, e.g., Ellis v. Carter, 291 F.2d 270, 273-74 (9th Cir. 1961) (according
equal rights to buyers and sellers under Rule 10b-5, including private cause of action); Birn-
baum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461, 464 (2d Cir. 1952) (private cause of action
limited to purchasers or sellers of securities), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 956 (1953); Fischman v.
Raytheon, 188 F.2d 783, 787 (2d Cir. 1951) (buyer has right to implied cause of action when
fraud shown).
" See 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961).
40 Id. at 912.
41 Id. Chairman Cary set forth a two-pronged test for imposition of the duty to disclose
beyond the traditional corporate insiders:
First, the existence of a relationship giving access, directly or indirectly, to infor-
mation intended to be available only for a corporate purpose and not for the per-
sonal benefit of anyone, and second, the inherent unfairness involved where a
party takes advantage of such information knowing it is unavailable to those with
whom he is dealing.
Id. Chairman Cary advocated an interpretation of securities laws which incorporated
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ELIMINATION OF THE FIDUCIARY RELATIONSHIP REQUIREMENT
In the years following Cady, Roberts, the SEC and the courts
moved steadily away from the narrow application of fiduciary obli-
gations imposed at common law.42 In SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur
Co.,45 the Second Circuit defined the function of Rule 10b-5 as en-
suring that all investors have equal access to material information
regardless of whether traditional or "special facts" fiduciary con-
cepts were applicable." Adopting the Cady, Roberts delineation of
insider status,45 the court held that anyone in possession of inside
information must either disclose it to the investing public or re-
frain from trading.46
broader anti-fraud concepts than those at common law and reaffirmed the expansion of
common law liability to encompass transactions by insiders with purchasers who were not
previous shareholders. See id. at 911-12.
42 See, e.g., New Park Mining Co. v. Cranmer, 225 F. Supp. 261, 266 (S.D.N.Y. 1963)
(corporation allowed to sue former officers and directors, thus relaxing privity requirement
under Rule 10b-5); Pettit v. American Stock Exch., 217 F. Supp. 21, 28 (S.D.N.Y. 1963) (suit
permitted against wide variety of persons accused of defrauding issuer); Cochran v. Chan-
ning Corp., 211 F. Supp. 239, 243 (S.D.N.Y. 1962) (violation of Rule 10b-5 by remaining
silent when duty to speak exists).
Impetus for the movement was provided by the Supreme Court's liberal approach to
statutory construction in SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180 (1963).
In an action brought under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-1 to 80b-
21 (1982), Justice Goldberg, writing for the Court, rejected the Second Circuit's interpreta-
tion of the anti-fraud section of this Act, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6 (1982), as being limited by
traditional common law fraud and deceit requirements. Capital Gains, 375 U.S. at 192. In-
stead, he emphasized that a "fundamental purpose" of securities legislation "was to substi-
tute a philosophy of full disclosure for the philosophy of caveat emptor and thus to achieve
a high standard of business ethics in the securities industry." Id. at 186 (footnote omitted).
After a discussion of the common law and fraudulent securities transactions by fiduciaries,
Justice Goldberg further stated that Congress, aware of relaxations in the common law, in-
tended that securities anti-fraud legislation be construed "not technically and restrictively,
but flexibly to effectuate its remedial purposes." Id. at 195. Justice Goldberg's words have
been quoted extensively as courts continued to expand the scope of Rule 10b-5. See Affili-
ated Ute Citizens of Utah v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 151 (1972); United States v. Car-
penter, 791 F.2d 1024, 1029 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 107 S. Ct. 666 (1986); Shapiro v. Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228, 237 (2d Cir. 1974).
43 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
41 Id. at 848.
45 See supra note 41 for the Cady, Roberts test.
"e Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d at 848. The case centered on misleading press releases
regarding copper, zinc, and silver deposits in Canadian land owned by the corporation. Id.
at 843-47. The court declared that:
anyone in possession of material inside information must either disclose it to the
investing public, or, if he is disabled from disclosing it in order to protect a corpo-
rate confidence, or if he chooses not to do so, must abstain from trading in or
recommending the securities concerned while such inside information remains
undisclosed.
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After the decision in Texas Gulf Sulphur, the courts,,with the
full support of the SEC, expanded the list of insiders and transac-
tions covered by Rule 10b-5 and further relaxed common law re-
quirements for fraudulent nondisclosure while emphasizing the
goal of achieving fairness and equal access to information for all
investors in the securities markets.4 " In United States v.
Chiarella4 8 the Second Circuit, in its discussion of the duty to dis-
close or abstain from trading, made no reference to the existence of
a fiduciary relationship. 49 A printer's markup man had deciphered
the names of companies targeted for tender offers by the printer's
corporate employer and then traded in the target company's secur-
ities prior to the release of the information." The Second Circuit
affirmed the conviction of Chiarella and held that
"[a]nyone-corporate insider or not-who regularly receives mate-
rial nonpublic information may not use that information ... with-
out incurring an affirmative duty to disclose."5 1 While Rule 10b-5
Id. at 848. The court also expanded the definition of material information to include "not
only information disclosing the earnings and distribution of a company but also those facts
which... may affect the desire of investors to buy, sell, or hold the company's securities."
Id. at 849. This definition effectively eliminated any distinction between corporate and mar-
ket information and left the issue of materiality to be decided on a case-by-case basis. Id.
47 See Radiation Dynamics, Inc. v. Goldmuntz, 464 F.2d 876, 890 (2d Cir. 1972) (quot-
ing SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 195 (1963)); Langevoort,
supra note 3, at 9; Macey, From Fairness to Contract: The New Direction of the Rules
Against Insider Trading, 13 HOFSTRA L. REV. 9, 17-19 (1984) (discussing Texas Gulf
Sulphur). During the period following Texas Gulf Sulphur, the courts extended "insiders"
to include both tippers and tippees. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228, 239-40 (2d Cir. 1974). At the same time those who had standing to
sue in private causes of action were extended to include open market sellers and offerees of
stock. See Manor Drug Stores v. Blue Chip Stamps, 492 F.2d 136, 141-42 (9th Cir. 1973)
(signators to consent decree to purchase securities had standing), rev'd, 421 U.S. 723 (1975);
Mitchell v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 90, 100-03 (10th Cir.) (common law require-
ment of privity eliminated), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1004 (1971). Transactions prohibited
under Rule lOb-5 were expanded to include mergers, proxy solicitations, and all fraudulent
schemes. See SEC v. National Sec., Inc., 393 U.S. 453, 468 (1969) (application of lOb-5 to
proxy solicitations); A.T. Brod v. Perlow, 375 F.2d 393, 396-97 (2d Cir. 1967) (rule applies to
all investors in all types of schemes). Additionally, the Supreme Court stated that the "in
connection with" language of Rule 10b-5 was satisfied by transactions touching a purchase
or sale of securities. See Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co., 404 U.S. 6,
12 (1971) (a sale satisifies "in connection with" requirement). The common law elements of
causation and reliance were deemed satisfied by the illegal trading on material information.
See Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 154 (1972).
48 588 F.2d 1358 (2d Cir. 1978), rev'd, 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
40 Id. at 1365.
11 Id. at 1363.
" Id. at 1365 (emphasis in original). Under this expansive statement of the duty to
disclose, the court found Chiarella guilty of criminal violation of section 10(b) and Rule 10b-
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was intended as a means of prohibiting and penalizing corporate
insiders' fraudulent purchases of securities, the Second Circuit uti-
lized it to ensure equal access to all material information regarding
the purchase or sale of securities. 52 Anyone who failed to disclose
material nonpublic information before trading could face not only
sanctions imposed by the SEC,53 but also criminal prosecution5
and liability for damages in private litigation.5 Imposition of the
duty to disclose required only that the person in possession of the
information "regularly" receive it.56
FIDUCIARY REQUIREMENTS REINSTATED: Chiarella AND Dirks
The Supreme Court considered the substantive reach of Rule
10b-5 for the first time when it reviewed the Second Circuit's
Chiarella decision.57 Relying on the need for authority in the ena-
bling statute for the proscriptions of Rule 10b-5, the Court af-
5. Id. at 1366, 1373. Although traditional analysis would conclude that Chiarella was an
outsider, the court labelled him a "market insider" on the basis of his continuing access to
the target company names; it was held irrelevant that he was not an insider of the target
companies in whose stock he traded. Id. at 1365-66. The court relied on traditional concepts
of the need for fairness, market integrity, and equity in securities transactions. Id. at 1365.
82 See id. at 1362 (Congress "created a system providing equal access to the informa-
tion necessary for reasoned and intelligent investment decisions"). But see id. at 1373-78
(Meskill, J., dissenting) (criticizing unwarranted expansion of Rule 10b-5 to encompass
Chiarella). The belief that the securities laws were intended to insure equal access to mate-
rial information developed steadily in the courts from the enactment of Rule 10b-5. See,
e.g., Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 99 F. Supp. 808, 828 (D. Del. 1951) (duty to disclose an
attempt to provide equalization of bargaining position). It was first stated definitively in
SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 848 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976
(1969).
88 See Securities Exchange Act § 21(d), 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d) (1982) (granting SEC au-
thority to seek injunctive relief). Disgorgement of profits may be ordered by a United States
District Court pursuant to ancillary jurisdiction. See Farrand, Ancillary Remedies in SEC
Civil Enforcement Suits, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1779, 1800-05 (1976); Comment, Equitable Reme-
dies in SEC Enforcement Action, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1188, 1194-96 (1975).
8 See Securities Exchange Act § 32(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(a) (1982) (penalties provision
for willful violation of Exchange Act).
88 See Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 380 (1983). The Court recog-
nized the existence of an implied private cause of action for damaged buyers and sellers
under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. Id.
8" See United States v. Chiarella, 588 F.2d 1358, 1365 (2d Cir. 1978), rev'd, 445 U.S. 222
(1980). Chief Judge Kaufman, writing for the court, stated that the test to determine insider
status was whether the individual had "regular access to market information." Id. The court
gave no further indication of the parameters of the test, leaving determination to be made
by the courts on a case-by-case basis. Id. at 1365-66.
87 See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 225-30 (1980).
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firmed the common law underpinnings of section 10(b) 18 Justice
Powell, writing for the majority, stated that mere possession of ma-
terial nonpublic information does not impose an obligation to dis-
close or a duty to refrain from trading.5 9 Instead, the Court in-
sisted that such a duty arises from a relationship of trust and
confidence between parties to a business transaction. 0 The Court
held that since section 10(b) aims to prevent fraud, and that non-
disclosure can be fraudulent only when there is a duty to speak, a
relationship that gives rise to a duty to disclose must exist before
Rule 10b-5 can be violated." The Court thus affirmed the interpre-
tation of violative insider trading first articulated by the SEC al-
most twenty years earlier in Cady, Roberts and rejected the Sec-
ond Circuit's equal access approach. 2
Three years after Chiarella, the Supreme Court considered the
issue of tippee liability6 3 in Dirks v. SEC.4 The Chiarella holding
58 Id. at 234-35. The Court stated: "Section 10(b) is aptly described as a catchall provi-
sion, but what it catches must be fraud." Id.
51 Id. at 235. In effect, the Court rejected the lower court's delineation of the parame-
ters of insider trading violations. Id. at 231-33.
" Id. at 230.
Id. at 235.
82 Id. at 228, 236-37; In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 910 (1961). The Court
cited Cady, Roberts at length, indicating approval of its fiduciary relationship requirement
between "shareholders of a corporation and those insiders who have obtained confidential
information by reason of their position with that corporation." Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 228.
In response to the decision in Chiarella, the SEC adopted Rule 14e-3, 17 C.F.R. §
240.14e-3 (1986), which prohibits the purchase or sale of securities of target companies in
tender offer situations by anyone possessing material nonpublic information relating to an
offer that has commenced or toward which a substantial step has been taken. Rule 14e-3
requires that the person in possession of the information know that it was acquired from the
offeror, the issuer of the target securities or any officer, director, partner or employee or
person acting on behalf of the offeror or issuer. Id.; see Pub. L. No. 91-567, 84 Stat. 1496,
1497-98 (1970) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(1) (1982)) (amending Williams Act, Pub. L.
No. 90-439, 82 Stat. 454 (1968)).
3 Tippee liability was first established by the SEC in In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40
S.E.C. 907 (1961). The tippee brokerage firm received the information on which it traded
from its employee, Cowdin, who was also a director of the issuing corporation. Id. at 909 &
n.4. Cowdin thus breached his duty of confidentiality by revealing the information. See id.
at 909, 912. However, the emphasis in Cady, Roberts was on expanding the category of
insiders, see id. at 912-13, and it was not until 1968 and 1971 that the issues raised by the
"tipping" of material nonpublic information were specifically addressed. See SEC v. Texas
Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969); In re Inves-
tors Management Co., 44 S.E.C. 633 (1971). Building on the references to tipper and tippee
liability in Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d at 852, 856, the SEC held that the tipper of infor-
mation was liable under Rule 10b-5 even if he did not actually trade in securities and also
imposed liability on the tippee who received and traded on the information. See Investors
Management, 44 S.E.C. at 642-47; In re Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 43 S.E.C.
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was extended to encompass the tippees of insiders. 5 The Court
held that the tippee's duty to disclose derives from the tipper's
obligation, which arises from his fiduciary relationship with the
corporate source of the information.6 Further, the Court required
that the tippee must know or have reason to know that the tipper
has breached a fiduciary obligation by revealing the information.67
Finally, the Court stated that whether the insider's tip constitutes
a breach depends upon whether the insider receives a direct or in-
direct personal benefit.6" The Dirks Court reaffirmed the view that
violations of Rule 10b-5 must be predicated on the existence of a
fiduciary relationship and require scienter on the part of both the
tipper and the tippee 9
933, 936 (1968). The test for tippee liability was that the information be confidential and
material and that the tippee "knew or had reason to know that the information was...
obtained improperly by selective revelation or otherwise." See Investors Management, 44
S.E.C. at 649. Commissioner Smith took issue with this test and stated that the tippee's
knowledge that the insider tipper was breaching a fiduciary duty must be established. See
id. at 643 (Smith, Comm'r, concurring). Subsequently, the Second Circuit implicitly gave
judicial approval to the doctrine of tippee liability as stated by the SEC. See Shapiro v.
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 495 F.2d 228, 239-40 (2d Cir. 1974).
463 U.S. 646 (1983).
65 Id. at 657-58. The Court, in its discussion of tippee liability, relied on footnote 12 in
Chiarella which read: "The tippee's obligation has been viewed as arising from his role as a
participant after the fact in the insider's breach of a fiduciary duty." Chiarella, 445 U.S. at
230 n.12 (citation omitted). See Dirks, 463 U.S. at 659-61, 667.
Dirks, an officer of a broker-dealer firm, received information concerning fraudulent
corporate practices from a former officer of Equity Funding of America and unsuccessfully
attempted to expose the fraud. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 648-49. He then informed some clients
and investors who sold their stock based on his information, causing the price to drop. Id. at
649-50.
" Id. at 659 (citations omitted).
'1 Id. at 660. The Dirks Court's emphasis on the tippee's knowledge drew on Commis-
sioner Smith's concurrence in In re Investors Management Co., 44 S.E.C. 633, 650 (1971)
(Smith, Comm'r, concurring). See Dirks, 463 U.S. at 660 & n.19; see also supra note 63
(tippee liability).
68 Dirks, 463 U.S. at 662. The Court stated that whether there has been a breach of
duty by the insider-tipper depends on "whether the insider receives a direct or indirect
personal benefit from the disclosure, such as a pecuniary gain or a reputational benefit that
will translate into future earnings." Id. at 663. This indicates the Court's desire to limit the
personal gain to financial benefits derived from securities transactions. See id. at 664.
69 See Dirks, 463 U.S. at 660-63; Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 691 (1980) (requiring
scienter in section 10(b) civil actions). In a footnote, the Court also enlarged the scope of
those considered to be tippers to include those who enter into a "special confidential rela-
tionship" and "are given access to information solely for a corporate purpose." Dirks, 463
U.S. at 655 n.14. Such persons are considered to be "temporary" insiders, and the Court
specifically included underwriters, accountants, lawyers, or consultants working for the cor-
poration in this category. See id. The Court's statement has been expanded to include any-
one who may be considered a "temporary" or "constructive" insider. See, e.g., SEC v. Tome,
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Some commentators have expressed disapproval and surprise
at the Court's return to the narrow application of common law
principles governing fraudulent misrepresentation in both
Chiarella and Dirks.7 0 The Supreme Court has continually empha-
sized that section 10(b) intended to prevent common law fraud, as
buttressed by the language of the statute and its legislative his-
tory.7 '1 In limiting the applicability of Rule 10b-5 to fraudulent
nondisclosure, the Court has stated that it is neither empowered to
rewrite legislation nor to expand the reaches of the rule beyond the
language of the enabling statute. 2 Under the most expansive view
of common law requirements for establishing nondisclosure as
fraudulent misrepresentation, a relationship of trust and confi-
dence must exist before a duty arises to disclose material nonpub-
lic information in a business transaction.7 3 It is maintained that
638 F. Supp. 596, 620-22 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (court imposed "temporary" insider status); SEC
v. Lund, 570 F. Supp. 1397, 1403 (C.D. Cal. 1983) (corporate official given material nonpub-
lic information by another company's official in business confidence).
The Court reversed Dirks' conviction on the grounds that he did not possess the deriva-
tive duty to disclose information before trading. See Dirks, 463 U.S. at 665-67. The insider
from whom Dirks received the information had not breached his fiduciary duty to the cor-
porate employer or the shareholders because he had no motive of personal gain in attempt-
ing to expose the fraud. See id. at 667. Further, Dirks did not solicit or use the information
for personal gain. Id. at 665-66. Under the Dirks ruling, then, those tippees who accidentally
or inadvertently overhear material nonpublic information with no breach by the insider are
free to trade on the basis of the information. Dirks also does not reach the surreptitious
eavesdropper because there is no breach by the unknowing insider. Cf. Wang, supra note 3,
at 1289 (eavesdropper does not breach fiduciary duty under Chiarella). For a discussion of
the impact of Dirks, see generally Note, The Supreme Court's Highwire Act: Balancing
SEC Enforcement and Market Efficiency in Dirks v. SEC, 45 U. Prrr. L. REV. 923 (1984).
70 See generally Aldave, supra note 4, at 121-25 (advocating adoption of misappropria-
tion theory to avoid Chiarella and Dirks restrictions); Anderson, supra note 7, at 354-56
(critical of Court's's imposition of common law misrepresentation).
71 See Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 226. The Court further emphasized that this result is sup-
ported by the legislative history and language of the statute. See id. at 226, 235; see also
Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 472-74 (1977) (nothing in legislative history war-
rants extending section 10(b) to encompass fraud which does not include deception or ma-
nipulation); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 749-55 (1975) (language
and legislative history of section 10(b) limits private cause of action to purchasers or sellers
of securities).
72 See Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. at 748-49 & 756 (Powell, J., concurring). Justice
Powell stated: "The starting point in every case involving construction of a statute is the
language itself." Id. at 756 (Powell, J., concurring). Noting that the Court was being asked
to extend section 10(b) to include the offer to sell any security, Justice Powell then added:
"Before a court properly could consider taking such liberty with statutory language there
should be, at least, unmistakable support in the history and structure of the legislation.
None exists in this case." Id. (Powell, J., concurring).
73 See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
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the Second Circuit's elimination of the most basic requirement for
a finding of fraudulent nondisclosure was incongruous with prior
Supreme Court rulings, and the Court's refusal to sanction the to-
tal abandonment of the fiduciary relationship requirement was a
logical and consistent application of prior constructions of the pur-
pose of section 10(b) and the scope of Rule 10b-5.
THE MISAPPROPRIATION THEORY ALTERNATIVE
In response to the limitations imposed by the Supreme Court,
the SEC and the Second Circuit have advocated a misappropria-
tion theory to impose criminal and civil liability on nontraditional
insiders and tippees. The government first advanced this theory in
Chiarella when it argued that Chiarella had breached a duty to the
acquiring corporations by misappropriating information entrusted
to his employer and therefore had committed fraud upon both the
entrusting corporate client and the sellers of the target companies'
securities. 4 Writing for the majority, Justice Powell concluded
that, because the theory had not been submitted to the jury, the
issue was not properly before the Court.7 5 However, four Justices
indicated varying degrees of acceptance of the misappropriation
theory."0
Based on this indication of support for the misappropriation
theory in Chiarella, the government advanced the theory in
United States v. Newman. 7 In Newman, the government alleged
that employees of two investment banking firms, aided and abet-
ted by Newman, had violated Rule 10b-5 by misappropriating and
11 See Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 235-37.
75 Id. at 236-37.
" See id. at 238-51. In a concurrence, Justice Stevens indicated that the theory could
form the basis of an action for fraud upon the acquiring corporations, but noted that they
would be unable to recover damages since they were neither buyers nor sellers of the traded
securities. Id. at 238 (Stevens, J., concurring). Chief Justice Burger and Justice Brennan
would have imposed liability on Chiarella on the theory that anyone who misappropriates
material nonpublic information has an affirmative duty to either disclose or refrain from
trading. Id. at 239-45 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); id. at 238-39 (Brennan, J., concurring in
judgment). While acknowledging the validity of the misappropriation theory, Justices
Blackmun and Marshall would have upheld the conviction under a broad interpretation of
section 10(b) as prohibiting anyone from trading on the basis of material information not
legally available to the general investing public. Id. at 251 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). This
theory of Rule 10b-5 liability had been suggested by Professor Brudney, who posited that
those having an "unerodable informational advantage" should be precluded from trading on
the basis of that advantage. Brudney, supra note 3, at 360-61.
"' 664 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 863 (1983).
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trading on confidential information relating to the acquisitions and
tender offers of corporate clients of the banking firms." In revers-
ing the district court's dismissal of the criminal indictments, the
Second Circuit judicially approved the misappropriation theory." '
The court found that the employees' breach of their duty of confi-
dentiality to their employers and the subsequent trading satisfied
the requirements laid down in Chiarella for Rule 10b-5 liability. 0
The conspirators had damaged the reputations of the investment
banking firms and defrauded the bidders by artificially inflating
the market price of the stock; additionally, the court implied that
the damage extended to those from whom the defendants had pur-
chased stock.' However, in a subsequent private action for dam-
ages against one of the banking firms by a seller of the target se-
curities, 2 the Second Circuit held that because there was no
fiduciary relationship between the corporate clients and the sellers,
there was no derivative relationship between the banking firm or
its employees and the sellers.8 " Thus, the court held, there was no
duty to disclose and no cause of action available to the sellers.84
Four years later, in SEC v. Materia,8 5 the Second Circuit held
that Materia, a copyreader employed by a financial printer, had
defrauded his employer and violated Rule 10b-5 by misappropriat-
ing confidential information concerning proposed tender offers of
the printer's corporate clients for the purpose of trading in the se-
78 Id. at 16. The district court, relying on the Supreme Court holding in Chiarella had
dismissed the indictment on the grounds that since neither Newman nor the employees had
any fiduciary relationship with the purchasers or sellers of stock in the target companies,
there was no duty to disclose before trading and hence no violation of securities laws. See id.
at 14-15.
79 The Newman court quoted Chief Justice Burger's statement that Chiarella "misap-
propriated-stole, to put it bluntly-valuable nonpublic information entrusted to him in the
utmost confidence." See Newman, 664 F.2d at 17 (quoting Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 245 (Bur-
ger, C.J., dissenting)). The court further stated that the defendants had defrauded the em-
ployers "as surely as if they took their money." Newman, 664 F.2d at 17.
8o Id. at 18-19. The court also held that the purchaser or seller requirement for stand-
ing in a private cause of action was unnecessary in a SEC action for injunctive relief. Id. at
17.
" Id. at 17-18. The Newman court also stated that sufficient notice as to the illegality
of the actions charged was provided by Rule 10b-5's proscriptions of fraudulent and decep-
tive devices. Id. at 19.
R2 Moss v. Morgan Stanley, Inc., 719 F.2d 5 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1025
(1984).
83 Id. at 15-16.
84 Id. at 13.
85 745 F.2d 197 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1053 (1985).
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curities of the target companies."' The court again emphasized the
breach of confidentiality and damage to the reputation of the em-
ployer and similar damages to the corporate clients through infla-
tion of the price of the target securities.8 7 However, the court ac-
knowledged that Materia's duty did not extend to the sellers of the
securities even though they had been damaged by his actions.8
THE MISAPPROPRIATION THEORY EXPANDED: United States v.
Carpenter
The Second Circuit significantly expanded its application of
the misappropriation theory in United States v. Carpenter.as A di-
e6 See id. at 199-201. Prior to Materia, the district court had used the misappropriation
theory in SEC v. Musella, 578 F. Supp. 425 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (mem.). In Musella, the court
held that the tippees of a New York law firm employee had violated Rule 10b-5 by trading
on material nonpublic information which he had misappropriated from his employer. Id. at
438-39. The tippee's liability was derived from the breach of the employee's duty of confi-
dentiality to the law firm and through it to the, firm's corporate clients. Id. at 439. However,
the court rejected the SEC contention that the law firm had acquired a fiduciary duty to the
shareholders of the target corporations. Id. at 437. Relying on the Second Circuit's holding
in Newman and the district court's holding in Materia, the court stated that "distinctions
premised on the source of the information undermine the prophylactic intent of the securi-
ties laws." Id. at 438.
867 Materia, 745 F.2d at 202. In the statements of Justices Powell and Stevens in
Chiarella regarding the misappropriation theory, the emphasis was on the misappropriator's
duty to the corporate clients of the employer, the acquiring corporation. See Chiarella v.
United States, 445 U.S. 222, 232-33, 237 (1980) (Stevens, J., concurring). Under common law
agency principles, the employee is the subagent of the employer, who is the agent of the
principal; thus, the employee owes the same fiduciary duties to the acquiring corporation as
the agent, and therefore is precluded under agency law from using confidential information
entrusted to the agent. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 395 (1958); 1 F. MEACHEM.
LAW OF AGENCY §§ 1189, 1191, 1209, 1224 (2d ed. 1914). Unauthorized use of the principal's
property by the agent requires that any profit be held in constructive trust for the principal
whether harmed or not. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §, 388 & comment c (1958);
RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 201(2) (1937). The misappropriation theory, as interpreted
by Justices Powell and Stevens in Chiarella, thus parallels agency concepts. See Chiarella,
445 U.S. at 233, 237 (Stevens, J., concurring). Agency has been accepted as the basis for
requiring a fiduciary relationship before imposition of the duty to disclose or abstain as
delineated in securities law. See Langevoort, supra note 3, at 19 (imposition of duty to
disclose federal analogue of agency law). Agency law was cited by the Second Circuit in
support of its finding that Chiarella had breached a fiduciary duty to his employer and the
acquiring corporations. See United States v. Chiarella, 588 F.2d 1358, 1365 (2d Cir. 1978),
rev'd, 445 U.S. 222 (1980); see also SEC v. Tome, 638 F. Supp. 596, 623 (S.D.N.Y. 1986)
(common law agency principles apply to section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 violations). The appli-
cation of agency principles to Newman and Materia provides the direct relationship between
the misappropriator and a corporate trader.
Materia, 745 F.2d at 203 (acknowledging ruling in Moss v. Morgan Stanley, Inc., 719
F.2d 5 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1025 (1984)).
89 791 F.2d 1024 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 107 S. Ct. 666 (1986). Prior to the Carpenter
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vided court affirmed the criminal conviction of a Wall Street Jour-
nal financial reporter, R. Foster Winans, who revealed the publica-
tion schedule and contents of the Journal's "Heard on the Street"
columns to a broker-dealer, who in turn traded prior to publication
in the stock of the companies to be discussed in the articles. 90
There was no claim that Winans, whom the court characterized as
a market outsider, improperly altered the content of the columns
or that the information constituted confidential corporate or mar-
ket information since it was available to the public generally.91 In
addition, neither the Journal nor its parent company, Dow Jones
decision, the Southern District of New York employed the misappropriation theory in a case
involving a son's use of information received from his father. See United States v. Reed, 601
F. Supp. 689, 699-703 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd in part, 773 F.2d 477 (2d Cir. 1985) In Reed, the
father, a member of the board of directors of a corporation considering a merger proposal,
revealed material information about the proposal to his son, who traded on the basis of the
information. Id. at 690-91. The court acknowledged that the father had no motive of per-
sonal gain and that no derivative tippee liability existed under the Dirks test. Id. at 699.
However, relying on the Second Circuit decisions in Newman and Materia, the court held
that the son could be held liable for violating section 10(b) under the misappropriation
theory, since the father had revealed the information based on a relationship of trust and
confidence. Id. at 703. The court stated that misappropriation of secret information "for
personal aggrandizement in breach of such a relationship constitutes fraud." Id. at 700.
90 Carpenter, 791 F.2d at 1026. Illegal trading in securities by financial analysts and
advisers is referred to as "scalping." Scalping usually involves the purchase of securities by
someone in a position to influence others, followed by a recommendation of the securities
and subsequent sale by the scalper after the market price has reflected the recommendation.
See SEC v. Blavin, 557 F. Supp. 1304, 1308 (E.D. Mich. 1983), aff'd, 760 F.2d 706 (6th Cir.
1985); Peskind, Regulation of the Financial Press: A New Dimension to Section 10(b) and
Rule 10b-5, 14 ST. Louis U.L.J. 80, 81 (1969). Such activity is prohibited by the Investment
Advisers Act § 206, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6 (1982). However, one of the provisions specifically
excludes the financial press. See 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(11)(D) (1982).
It is generally agreed that a member of the financial press has no fiduciary relationship
with the general readership and thus owes no duty to disclose or abstain from trading in the
securities about which he writes. See Peskind, supra, at 85; Note, The Inadequacy of Rule
10b-5 to Address Outsider Trading by Reporters, 38 STAN. L. REv. 1549, 1558 (1986). In its
original complaint, the government had posited that Winans was under a duty to disclose
his trading under a general duty-to-readership theory, but it dropped this allegation before
the case was tried in the district court. See United States v. Winans, 612 F. Supp. 827, 840
n.7 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), aff'd, 791 F.2d 1024 (2d Cir. 1986).
The Ninth Circuit has held that a financial columnist violated section 10(b) and Rule
lOb-5 by scalping. See Zweig v. Hearst Corp., 594 F.2d 1261 (9th Cir. 1979). The Zweig court
acknowledged that the columnist's relationship to the public was not a fiduciary one under
the common law, but nonetheless held that under the facts of the case, the columnist had a
duty to his readers to reveal his stock holdings and any intent to buy or sell, citing a "flexi-
ble duty" standard. Id. at 1268. The viability of the Zweig holding, referred to by the Car-
penter court, has been seriously undercut by the Supreme Court's reinforcement of common
law fiduciary relationship principles in Chiarella. See Lowe v. SEC, 472 U.S. 181, 225-26 n.9
(1985) (White, J., concurring).
91 See Carpenter, 791 F.2d at 1031-32.
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& Co., engaged in securities trading or had corporate clients who
were the source of the information in the columns.92 Instead, the
court relied on Winans' knowing violation of the Journal's policy
forbidding employee use of confidential information and the ac-
knowledged impact of the "Heard" columns on the market price of
securities.9" The court ruled that Winans had misappropriated ma-
terial information and traded upon it, and that the reporter's duty
of confidentiality to the Journal resulted in a "corollary duty" to
disclose the information to those with whom he and his co-defend-
ants traded or abstain from trading. 4
The misappropriation theory, as applied by the Carpenter
court, presupposes that the misappropriation of market-sensitive
information from an employer, combined with subsequent trading
in the securities market on the basis of the information satisfies
the requirements for Rule 10b-5 liability, regardless of whether any
fiduciary relationship exists between the misappropriator and a
market participant.9 5 In addition, the Second Circuit imposed a
82 Id. at 1029. The court adopted a broad interpretation of the misappropriation theory
as proscribing "the conversion by 'insiders' or others of material non-public information in
connection with the purchase or sale of securities." Id. (emphasis omitted).
93 Id. at 1026, 1031-32. The court acknowledged that the individuals supplying the in-
formation for the column and the Journal itself could have traded on the basis of that
information. Id. at 1033. See Wang, supra note 3, at 1296.
" Id. at 1034. The court stated:
Thus, because of his duty of confidentiality to the Journal, defendant Wi-
nans-and Felis and Carpenter, who knowingly participated with him-had a co-
rollary duty, which they breached, under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, to abstain
from trading in securities on the basis of the misappropriated information or to do
so only upon making adequate disclosure to those with whom they traded.
Id.
The court also briefly addressed the concern that imposing the duty to disclose on a
financial reporter might have a chilling effect on free speech. Noting that the confidentiality
restrictions were imposed by the Journal, the court emphasized that it was not restricting
what Winans could publish. Id. at 1034. See infra note 118 (first amendment concerns).
9" Carpenter, 791 F.2d at 1031-34. The Carpenter court's expansion of the misappro-
priation theory impliedly adopts the broad theory of liability advocated by Chief Justice
Burger and Justice Brennan in Chiarella. See supra note 76 and accompanying text. Lan-
guage employed by the Carpenter court also suggests that notions of morality and fairness
played a major iole in the decision. The court noted that one may not gain an advantage by
"conduct constituting secreting, stealing, purloining . . . chicanery, not competition; foul
play, not fair play." See Carpenter, 791 F.2d at 1031. The court further determined that the
defendants had adequate notice of the illegality of their actions by virtue of the Chiarelia,
Newman, and Materia decisions. Id. at 1034.
Shortly after the Carpenter decision, the District Court for the Southern District of
New York relied on the misappropriation theory in SEC v. Tome, 638 F. Supp. 596
(S.D.N.Y. 1986). Tome used his relationship with an executive officer of Joseph Seagram &
Co. to gain access to material nonpublic information regarding Seagram's plans for a hostile
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general duty to disclose or abstain similar to that earlier enunci-
ated in its Chiarella decision."' It is submitted that there are sig-
nificant deficiencies in this application of the theory which run
contrary to Supreme Court precedent and the main goal of securi-
ties anti-fraud legislation, protection of investors.
CONFLICTS WITH SUPREME COURT RULINGS
The basic precept of the misappropriation theory is that an
employee's breach of the duty of confidentiality to the employer
constitutes the fraud necessary for a Rule 10b-5 violation.9 7 How-
ever, the Supreme Court has held that not every breach of a fiduci-
ary duty constitutes the fraud necessary to violate Rule 10b-5. In
Santa Fe Industries v. Green,9e the Court stated that the breach
must be accompanied by deception, manipulation or nondisclosure
relating to the purchase or sale of securities.9 9 Even if an em-
ployee's breach constitutes a form of fraud, such fraudulent breach
may pertain to a duty owed to someone other than the purchaser
or seller of securities. 100 If the misappropriator deceives the share-
tender offer and thereafter traded in the securities of the target company. Id. at 599. The
court acknowledged that Tome could not be found guilty of violating Rule 10b-5 under the
Dirks test of derivative liability since Bronfman, the officer, had no motive of personal gain.
Id. at 617. However, Judge Pollack did not rely solely on the misappropriation theory. See
id. at 620. Tome was held to be a "temporary" insider under the language of footnote 14 in
Dirks because he had acted as a consultant to Seagram. Id. at 620-21 (citing Dirks v. SEC,
463 U.S. 646, 655 n.14 (1983)). Tome exemplifies the reliance on the misappropriation the-
ory, particularly in Rule 10b-5 actions arising out of tender offer situations. See id. at 619.
In Tome, as in Newman and Materia, a fiduciary duty unquestionably ran to the corpora-
tion involved in the tender offer. See id. at 620-22. These cases are easily distinguishable
from Carpenter where no such duty existed. As applied in Tome, the theory reflects a more
limited approach than was employed in Carpenter. In addition, Tome was an SEC enforce-
ment action resulting in injunctive relief and disgorgement of profits, see Tome, 638 F.
Supp. at 599, while Carpenter was a criminal action instituted after a settlement with the
SEC regarding disgorgement. See Carpenter, 791 F.2d at 1025-26.
96 See Carpenter, 791 F.2d at 1034; supra note 51 and accompanying text (Second Cir-
cuit's imposition of general duty either to disclose or to abstain from trading in United
States v. Chiarella, 588 F.2d 1358, 1365 (1978), rev'd, 445 U.S. 222 (1980)).
17 See supra notes 94-95 and accompanying text.
08 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
09 Id. at 473-76.
190 See Carpenter, 791 F.2d at 1029, 1032. The Carpenter court emphasized that it was
not necessary that there be a breach of a duty to either a corporate issuer or shareholder of
securities to constitute a violation of Rule 10b-5 under the misappropriation theory. Id. But
see id. at 1036-37 (Miner, J., dissenting in part) (application of theory to defendants for
securities fraud constitutes unwarranted extension of liability under section 10(b) and Rule
10b-5). The Second Circuit has held that the misappropriation theory cannot be employed
to sustain a private cause of action under Rule 10b-5 because there was no breach of duty to
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holder by failing to disclose material nonpublic information, such
deception does not occur in conjunction with the breach of a fidu-
ciary obligation since no fiduciary relationship exists between the
misappropriator and the shareholders. 101 Therefore, it is questiona-
ble whether the misappropriation theory by itself satisfies the re-
quirements of Santa Fe.02
The Second Circuit's current application of the misappropria-
tion theory also conflicts with the Supreme Court's requirement
that the duty to disclose or abstain from trading arises only out of
a relationship of trust and confidence between parties to a transac-
tion.103 Under the misappropriation theory as applied in Carpen-
ter, the misappropriator owes a duty to disclose to the sharehold-
ers of the traded securities even though he had no fiduciary
relationship with them.104 In Chiarella, the Supreme Court specifi-
cally rejected imposing such a general duty to disclose, stating,
"[w]e know of no rule of law.., that a purchaser of stock, who was
not an 'insider' and had no fiduciary relationship to a prospective
seller, had any obligation to reveal circumstances that might raise
a seller's demands and thus abort the sale.
°1 0 5
Favorable references to the misappropriation theory by some
Supreme Court Justices indicates a willingness to find a fiduciary
obligation owed to corporate clients who are market participants as
a sufficient basis for assessing a Rule 10b-5 violation."0 6 The theory
a purchaser or seller of securities. See Moss v. Morgan Stanley, Inc., 719 F.2d 5, 16 (2d Cir.
1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1025 (1984); supra notes 82-84 and accompanying text.
Some commentators have also questioned whether an employee's breach of confidenti-
ality constitutes fraud. See, e.g., Brudney, supra note 3, at 350-53 (distinguishing breaches
of fiduciary duty from narrower category of breaches involving deception and fraud); ABA
CoMMirrEE REPORT, supra note 3, at 236-37 (suggesting breach may not be fraud and noting
breach would be compounded by disclosure); see also Langevoort, supra note 3, at 47
(doubting ordinary breach of duty to employer constitutes fraud; actually abuse of trust);
Wang, supra note 3, at 1273 n.196 (rejecting "bootstrap fraud theory" which holds trading
on misappropriated information triggers duty to disclose to party to transaction).
101 See Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 475-76 (1977).
" See, e.g., Hiler, Dirks v. SEC-A Study in Cause and Effect, 43 MD. L. REv. 292, 326
& n.139 (1984) (misappropriation does not fulfill Santa Fe requirements); Phillips & Zutz,
supra note 37, ,at 91 (no deception or manipulation as required by Santa Fe); Note, supra
note 90, at 1561 (deception should be connected to deceived person's decision to trade).
1o3 See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 228 (1979).
104 See supra notes 95-99 and accompanying text.
011 Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 232 n.14 (quoting General Time Corp. v. Talley Indus., Inc.,
403 F.2d 159, 164 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1026 (1969)).
'6 See Eichler v. Berner, 472 U.S. 299, 313 n.22 (1985) (tippee may be liable for misap-
propriating or illegally obtaining information); Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 655 n.14 (1982)
(indicating that tippee liability may be predicated on illegally or improperly obtained infor-
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as presented to the Court in Chiarella and as employed by the
Second Circuit in both Materia and Newman emphasized the di-
rect link between the misappropriator and the corporate clients
who purchased securities in the target companies. 10 7 In Carpenter,
however, there was no corporate client to whom Winans owed any
duty. The court did not indicate how the duty to disclose to the
shareholders arose out of Winan's fiduciary relationship with his
employer or its parent company, neither of whom had any relation-
ship with the corporate issuers of the stock, the shareholders, or
the corporations who had generated the information.108 The court
simply stated that Winans' breach gave rise to a "corollary duty"
to disclose to those shareholders or abstain from trading.109 It is
asserted that the Second Circuit's imposition of a general duty to
disclose contravenes the Supreme Court's fiduciary relationship
requirement.1 0
Another discrepancy between the Supreme Court's current po-
sition regarding Rule 10b-5 violations and the Second Circuit's ex-
pansive use of the misappropriation theory relates to establishing
tippee liability under the derivative liability test of Dirks.'1 ' Under
Dirks, a tippee's liability for trading on the basis of material non-
public information is dependent on his having received the infor-
mation); supra note 76 (apparent endorsement of misappropriation theory by Chief Justice
Burger and Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun in Chiarella). The footnote refer-
ences in Eichler and Dirks merely leave open consideration of the theory, but do not en-
dorse it. It is very likely that these references advocate application of the theory to situa-
tions such as Chiarella, Newman, and Materia involving fiduciary obligations to
corporations which had generated material, confidential information regarding target com-
panies and where securities were traded in those companies. Both Materia and Newman fit
into the Chiarella pattern, and the Supreme Court denied certiorari to both. Materia v.
SEC, 471 U.S. 1053 (1985); Newman v. United States, 464 U.S. 863 (1983).
107 See SEC v. Materia, 745 F.2d 197 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1053 (1985);
United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 863 (1983).
Materia had deduced the names of companies targeted for tender offers by corporate clients
of his financial printing firm employer and traded on that information. See Materia, 745
F.2d at 199-200. Newman received the material confidential information from employees of
investment banking firms whose corporate clients had generated the information regarding
target companies. See Newman, 664 F.2d at 16.
103 See supra notes 75-89 and accompanying text.
103 See Carpenter, 791 F.2d at 1034.
"0 See Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 235 (when allegation of fraud based on nondisclosure, no
fraud absent duty to speak); Aldave, supra note 4, at 112-16 (questioning existence of duty
to disclose and noting Chiarella Court rejected duty to entire marketplace); Langevoort,
supra note 3, at 50 (suggesting exclusivity of Chiarella majority's delineation of pre-existing
fiduciary duty as source of disclosure obligation).
"' See supra notes 66-69 and accompanying text.
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mation from a tipper who breached a fiduciary duty by revealing
the information for personal gain.1 ' Utilizing the misappropriation
theory to impose liability upon tippees ignores the personal gain
requirement since the insider, whether it be an investment banking
firm or a financial newspaper, has no motive of personal gain in
revealing the information.13 The Second Circuit's expansive ap-
proach to tippee liability implies that anyone who receives material
nonpublic information and uses it to trade in the securities mar-
kets commits a violation of Rule 10b-5, regardless of the benefit to
the tipper. However, this very result was rejected by the Supreme
Court in Dirks."4 It is submitted that such an expansive applica-
tion of Rule 10b-5 fails to provide adequate notice as to which
trading activities violate securities laws.
In Dirks, the Supreme Court noted that market analysts pro-
vide an important service to the investment community and that
their ability to function would be inhibited by a blanket prohibi-
tion such as that suggested by the Second Circuit in Chiarella and
the District of Columbia Circuit in Dirks."15 The Court stated that
requiring a motive of personal gain on the part of the tipper would
allow analysts to function without fear of violating Rule lOb-5.1"
In requiring that a financial reporter either disclose or refrain from
trading, the Second Circuit failed to indicate the parameters of the
prohibition. 1 7 Carpenter has left many issues unresolved, includ-
ing whether a financial commentator must include a disclaimer re-
112 See id.
"1 See Note, supra note 90, at 1562. By definition, the misappropriation theory in-
volves information legitimately entrusted to employees by employers. In addition, the cor-
porate source of the information has a legitimate business purpose in entrusting the em-
ployer with the confidential information. See Note, supra note 69, at 943 (recipient of
information has obligation to evaluate motive of source and may safely use information en-
trusted for appropriate purpose).
114 Dirks, 463 U.S. at 662-64. The Carpenter court's application of the misappropria-
tion theory provides a further anomaly in that the employer and the sources of the informa-
tion for the "Heard" columns could have traded on the information, but the tippee-misap-
propriator Winans could not. See Carpenter, 791 F.2d at 1032; Wang, supra note 3, at 1296.
This directly contradicts Dirks which noted the significance of the fact that neither Dirks
nor his insider "source of the information traded in the securities of the company involved.
Dirks, 463 U.S. at 666. See also supra note 62 (development of tippee liability predicated on
tipper's preclusion from tipping).
11 See Dirks, 463 U.S. at 658-59, 662-63.
11 See id. at 662-64.
11 See Carpenter, 791 F.2d at 1034; supra note 95; see also Kostelanetz & Scott, supra
note 3, at 1, col. 3 (expressing concern with increase in criminal actions and possible lack of
proper notice of what conduct is criminal); NYC BAR COMMIT.EE REPORT, supra note 3 (law
not properly drawn to impose criminal penalties).
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garding his stock holding before reporting favorably or unfavorably
on such stocks.11
CONFLICTS WITH SECURITIES LAWS
The Supreme Court and lower federal and state courts have
consistently held that a major aim of securities legislation is to
protect the investing public from unfair manipulation of the secur-
ities markets.' Civil and criminal cases brought under Rule 10b-5
likewise emphasize the protection of investors as one of the pri-
mary functions of the rule and section 10(b).120 Because the misap-
18 See Carpenter, 719 F.2d at 1034; supra note 93. Some commentators and press or-
ganizations have expressed concern over the decision's possible impact on first amendment
rights. See, e.g., Note, Financial Reporters, the Securities Laws and the First Amendment:
Where to Draw the Line, 53 FORDHAM L. REV. 1035, 1051-54 (1985) (SEC action has dis-
turbing first amendment ramifications). But see, e.g., Note, The SEC's Regulation of the
Financial Press: The Legal Implications of the Misappropriation Theory, 52 BROoKLYN L.
REV. 43, 81-86 (1986) (regulation of reporter's activities not violative of first amendment
rights). While discussion of the possible first amendment issues raised by the Carpenter
decision is beyond the scope of this Note, the Supreme Court's previous holding in Lowe v.
SEC, 472 U.S. 181 (1985), indicates the current Court's attitude toward restraints on finan-
cial writers and securities violations. The holding in Lowe focused on an unregistered finan-
cial newsletter publisher's exemption from the provisions of the Investment Advisers Act, 15
U.S.C. §§ 80b-1 to 80b-21 (1982). The Court seemed anxious to establish liberal standards
for the Act's press exemption, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(11)(D) (1982), thus removing the finan-
cial newsletter from the reach of an SEC injunction prohibiting publication and precluding
,consideration of the first amendment issue of prior restraints. Lowe, 472 U.S. at 203-11. In
concurrence, Justice White, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist, believed
that the Court should have considered the constitutional issue and indicated that any blan-
ket pre-publication ban by the SEC would constitute prior restraint. See id. at 211, 235
(White, J., concurring in result). Justice White asserted that a flat prohibition of publication
such as requested by the SEC, is presumptively invalid and may be sustained only under
the most extraordinary circumstances. Id. at 234 (White, J., concurring in result). Further,
the Justice noted that even where "commercial speech" is concerned, restraints are permis-
sible only when "narrowly tailored to advance a legitimate government interest." Id. (White,
J., concurring in result). Although requiring a financial reporter to disclose or abstain from
trading is clearly not as restrictive as the SEC action Justice White stated as being uncon-
stitutional in Lowe, it is submitted that even such minimal restraint on the editorial deci-
sions of a reporter and a publisher is not justified by the government's need to enforce
securities laws since the present prohibition against insider trading exemplified in Carpen-
ter is not "narrowly tailored to advance a legitimate government interest."
'" See, e.g., Eichler v. Berner, 472 U.S. 299, 315 (1985) (stating primary objective of
securities laws to be protection of investing public and national economy); Dirks, 463 U.S. at
662 (citing with approval Cady, Roberts statement that purpose of securities laws to protect
investing public); Carpenter, 791 F.2d at 1032 (protection of investors major purpose of
section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5).
120 See Dirks, 463 U.S. at 653; Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 227. The Supreme Court has af-
firmed the Cady, Roberts interpretation of Rule 10b-5 as protecting the unknowing investor
from the inherent unfairness of insider trading. See Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 227.
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propriation theory relies on the damage done to employers rather
than to investors, Rule 10b-5 has been improperly utilized as a ve-
hicle to protect the reputations of employers.12' An employee's
fraudulent breach of the duty of confidentiality constitutes a fraud
against the employer, not against investors in the market.'22 Even
if trading on the basis of the misappropriated information ulti-
mately results in harm to private investors, as the Second Circuit
maintains, 2 ' such investors have no standing to sue because the
misappropriator has no fiduciary relationship with the purchasers
and sellers with whom he trades.24 It is submitted that the misap-
propriation theory erroneously focuses on protection of corporate
entities and employers rather than investors. Although safeguard-
ing the integrity of the marketplace may be an important function
of securities laws, the major thrust of securities legislation has
been and continues to be the need to protect the investing
public.12 5
A further inequity resulting from the Second Circuit's current
use of the misappropriation theory stems from conditioning the
employee's breach on whether the employer has a policy that pro-
hibits employee use of confidential information and whether that
policy was communicated to the employee.' 26 This leads to an
anomalous result when no policy forbidding the trading exists,
since the misappropriator may then trade with impunity from pos-
sible securities law violations even though he has used what the
Second Circuit has deemed a forbidden informational advantage
when prohibited by the employer. 2 ' As one commentator noted,
121 See, e.g., Aldave, supra note 4, at 235 (aim of securities laws to protect investors,
not employers); Phillips & Zutz, supra note 37, at 91 (anti-fraud legislation protects inves-
tors; breach of duty to employer actionable under state law).
122 There was no claim in Newman, Materia, or Carpenter that the defendants had
perpetrated a fraud against investors. Rather, the emphasis was on the fraud against the
employers as being sufficient to support a Rule 10b-5 claim.
123 See Carpenter, 791 F.2d at 1032.
124 See Moss v. Morgan Stanley, Inc., 719 F.2d 5, 13, cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1025 (1984)
(no "duty in the air" that gives rise to duty to disclose between misappropriator and seller
of stock).
125 See supra notes 121-122 and accompanying text.
126 See Carpenter, 791 F.2d at 1026 (employee found to know of newspaper's policy);
Materia, 745 F.2d at 202 (lower court found that Materia knew of employer's confidentiality
policy); Newman, 664 F.2d at 15 (investment banking firms' employees took "confidential"
information). There can be no breach of the employee's duty of confidentiality if he has
permission to use the information. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 395 (1958).
2I See Carpenter, 791 F.2d at 1026. The Carpenter court found it significant that Wi-
nans knew of the Journal's policy forbidding the use of any information gleaned while in its
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"[i]f the employer bans such transactions, the misappropriation
turns a violation of a company rule into a federal crime. ' '128 It is
urged that the disparity between public and private enforcement
of policies against insider trading demonstrates the need for clarifi-
cation of the misappropriation theory as a predicate for liability
under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.
THE NEED FOR CLARITY
Modern developments in the securities field have increased
outsiders' opportunities to garner huge profits by capitalizing on
their access to material confidential information, particularly in
the area of mergers, tender offers and acquisitions. 1 9 Faced with
the Supreme Court's imposition of common law fraud require-
ments for liability under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, the SEC
and the Second Circuit have endorsed and applied the misappro-
priation theory to penalize such activity. The issue, however, is not
whether the trading by outsiders with access to material nonpublic
information should be deterred and punished, but rather to what
extent the misappropriation theory constitutes an appropriate ve-
hicle for doing so under existing statutory and case law. At present
there are conflicting opinions regarding the efficacy of this the-
ory.130 The Supreme Court has granted certiorari in the Carpenter
employment. Id. This raises two questions. First, should Winans have been convicted of
securities fraud if he could have demonstrated that he did not know of the Journal policy?
If not, he could have traded with impunity although he still would have had the knowledge
which the court held unfair. Id. at 1032. Secondly, if the Journal had not had such a policy,
could Winans have traded with impunity with the same unfair informational advantage?
Under the present application of the misappropriation theory, the answer would be yes.
Liability for violating Rule 10b-5 would thus depend on whether the employer has a policy
of confidentiality and whether the employee is made aware of that policy. This could easily
result in inequitable enforcement of prohibitions against insider trading. For example, if the
Journal maintains its present policy and informs employees of that policy, the employees
may not use the confidential information as the basis for trading without incurring the af-
firmative obligation to disclose or abstain from trading. However, if another newspaper does
not have such a policy, its employees may use the information they gather, including publi-
cation schedules, as the basis for the purchase or sale of securities. It is submitted that this
dependence on the business policies of employers in order to enforce Rule 10b-5's proscrip-
tions against insider trading is an inequitable and ineffective method of enforcing securities
laws.
126 Wang, supra note 3, at 1296.
120 See, e.g., SEC v. Tome, 638 F. Supp. 596, 619 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (increased opportuni-
ties from mergers and takeovers).
130 See L. Loss, supra note 23, at 867; Kotler, Reporter Charged with Insider Trading,
5 CAL. LAw. 44, 46 (1985); Lewin, Some Assert SEC Pushes Law Too Far, N.Y. Times, July
21, 1986, at D5, col. 3; supra notes 76-97 and accompanying text. The SEC and the Second
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case and will presumably attempt to resolve many of these ques-
tions. 31 In addition, many clarifying suggestions have been set
forth by commentators,3 2 and Congress is currently considering
the need for new legislation to expand the scope of prohibitions
against insider trading.13
3
Circuit maintain that the theory is a statutorily sound means of applying the strictures of
Rule 10b-5 in compliance with Supreme Court rulings. However, numerous commentators,
including one of the draftsmen of Rule 10b-5, are uneasy regarding the use of the misappro-
priation theory. See Freeman, supra note 33, at 228-29. At present, the Second Circuit's
expansive application of the misappropriation theory remains the primary source of the law
regarding its use.
131 Carpenter v. United States, 107 S. Ct. 666 (1986). If the Supreme Court affirms the
Second Circuit's broad application of the misappropriation theory, it will signal the Court's
withdrawal from its current position regarding common law fiduciary principles and a will-
ingness to allow a broad construction of the scope of Rule 10b-5. Conversely, complete rejec-
tion of the theory by the Court will indicate its desire to require strict adherence to common
law principles governing fraudulent nondisclosure as laid down in Chiarella and Dirks. If
the Court rejects the broad holding in Carpenter but accepts a limited application of the
theory, as seems likely, a significant deficiency in the theory remains unless the Court with-
draws the required fiduciary relationship and allows imposition of the duty to disclose. For
example, the Supreme Court may limit the validity of the theory to situations involving
misappropriation of confidential material information from employers engaged in market
transactions or whose clients generated the information for market purposes. However, if
the Court does so hold, private investors harmed by the prohibited trading will not be able
to recover in private actions against either the misappropriator or the source of the informa-
tion under current law. See supra notes 81-83 and accompanying text.
"' See Silver, Penalizing Insider Trading: A Critical Assessment of the Insider Trad-
ing Sanctions Act of 1984, 1985 DuKs L.J. 960, 988-93 & accompanying notes. The Silver
article summarizes major proposals for revision of existing law during consideration of the
Insider Trading Sanctions Act. See id. One of the proposals favored by scholars and com-
mentators is the adoption of the American Law Institute's Proposed Federal Securities Code
(1983). See, e.g., L. Loss, supra note 23, at 105-06 (1984 Supp.) (recommending adoption of
ALI's proposal). Some commentators have recommended adopting legislation based on theo-
ries of liability for insider trading. See, e.g., Brudney, supra note 3, at 353-67 ("unerodable
information advantage" to form basis of proscriptions); Macey, supra note 47, at 30-32 (pro-
tection of corporate property rights in information it produces as underlying principle);
Note, Outsider Trading After Dirks v. SEC, 18 GA. L. REv. 593, 637-38 (1984) (constructive
insider approach of Dirks should be adopted). Professor Langevoort has suggested that per-
haps Congress should remove section 10(b) from its uneasy fraud base. See Langevoort,
supra note 3, at 5. Two specific legislative proposals have been made by the American Bar
Association Committee on Federal Regulation of Securities, both of which incorporate ver-
sions of the misappropriation theory. See ABA COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 3, at 259-72.
The Committee on Criminal Law of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York has
proposed a statute to clarify criminal liability. See NYC BAR COMM=TTEE REPORT, supra
note 3, at 18-30. One commentator has proposed legislation to encompass insider trading by
members of the financial press. See Note, supra note 90, at 1570-73.
1"3 See Proxmire Plans Inquiry, N.Y. Times, Nov. 24, 1986, at D6, col. 6 (chairman of
Senate Banking Committee to start investigation, consider new legislation). Congressional
approval of the SEC program against insider trading was demonstrated by its passage of the
Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984 ("ITSA"), which empowers the SEC to seek civil
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While developing injustices in the securities field may require
re-evaluation of securities anti-fraud legislation, it is submitted
that the Second Circuit's expansion of the misappropriation theory
is an inappropriate means of achieving this end. Imposing liability
on a financial reporter who has violated a fiduciary duty to his em-
ployer erroneously converts anti-fraud legislation into a vehicle for
protecting employers who are not involved in market transactions.
Such activity may violate ethical notions of fairness and integrity,
but it does not satisfy Supreme Court requirements for securities
fraud and represents an inappropriate administrative and judicial
expansion of existing law.
It is further suggested that the most significant deficiency in
current statutory and case law regarding insider trading is the lack
of a remedy for private investors defrauded by traders with whom
they have no fiduciary relationship. Despite recent SEC successes
in exposing and penalizing insider trading,1 34 private investors still
find themselves without a remedy when no fiduciary relationship
exists between the insider and the defrauded investor.136 Thus,
Congress should focus its attention on providing a private remedy
to such defrauded investors, rather than legislatively adopting the
Second Circuit's current application of the misappropriation
theory.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's interpretation of the substantive reach
of section 10(b) and the scope of Rule 10b-5 has evolved logically
penalties equal to three times the illegal profit made or losses avoided by the insider in
specified situations. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 21(d)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 78a(d)(2) (1982
& 1985 Supp.) For a discussion of the Act, its provisions and probable impact, see
Langevoort, Commentary-the Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984 and Its Effect on
Existing Law, 37 VAND. L. REv. 1273 (1984). During consideration of the ITSA, some legisla-
tors expressed approval of the misappropriation theory. See Insider Trading Sanctions and
SEC Enforcement Legislation: Hearings on H.R. 559 Before the Sub-Comm. on Telecom-
munications, Consumer Protection, and Finance of the House Comm. on Energy and Com-
merce, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1983) [hereinafter 1983 Hearings]; HR. REP. No. 355, 98th
Cong., 1st Sess. 4, 13-15, 13 n.20, 23 n.36 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEws 2274, 2277, 2287-92, 2287 n.20, 2297 n.36. However, Congress did not amend
section 10(b) or enact new legislation, relying on SEC assurances that such action was un-
necessary. See H.R. REP. No. 355, supra, at 14-15, 22 n.34; 1983 Hearings, supra, at 12;
Silver, supra note 132, at 979-80.
134 See generally Daugherty, supra note 3 (enumerating successful SEC actions).
35 See Wise, Class Actions Rising in Boesky Case, N.Y.L.J., Nov. 25, 1986, at 1, col. 2.
Ironically, the judge assigned to the private litigation arising out of the Boesky case is Judge
Milton Pollack, whose decision denying a private cause of action to sellers injured by the
misappropriators in Newman was upheld by the Second Circuit in Moss v. Morgan Stanley,
Inc., 719 F.2d 5 (1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1025 (1984).
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and in a manner consistent with the goals underlying such legisla-
tion. In sum, the Court has sought to protect the investing public
without unduly restricting market activity, while remaining within
the confines of the enabling statute and the common law principles
from which it arose.
Federal legislation should not attempt to remedy every ineq-
uity in the securities market.36 Likewise, not all insider trading
that violates moral or ethical principles violates current securities
laws. 137 Common law agency principles can adequately protect the
confidential information of employers without using federal securi-
ties laws in a manner for which they were neither designed nor
intended. Rather than seeking to judicially create a remedy where
none was statutorily foreseen, the Supreme Court should emphati-
cally reject the current unwarranted expansion of the misappropri-
ation theory. At the same time, Congress should address the major
problem facing defrauded private investors: the lack of an effective
private remedy where no fiduciary relationship exists with the in-
side trader.
Joan K. Martin
" See, e.g., Comment, supra note 37, at 1156. In assessing the future efficacy of Rule
10b-5 in ensuring market fairness one commentator warned "that the ignorant may lose out
to the shrewd is due largely to the fact that God did not create all men equal, a situation for
which Congress and the Securities Acts have not supplied a remedy." Id.
137 See Chiarella, 445 U.S. 222, 232 (1980).
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